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Labor rights and antitrust are back. Vast inequalities of the Gilded Age in the late 1800s
prompted enactment of landmark labor and antitrust laws in the Progressive and New Deal eras of
the late 19th and early 20th century.1 Then both labor and antitrust activism faded later in the 20th
century as more conservative and Law & Economics views increasingly prevailed on labor2 and
antitrust matters,3 while progressive reformers turned to other areas, such as the civil rights,
consumer, women’s, and environmental movements of the mid and late 1900s. Now however, with
recent years’ renewed focus on inequalities of wealth, progressive energy—sometimes with

1

See Sections II.B and III.

2

See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, What's Wrong with Police Unions?, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1333, 1390–91 (2020) (in 1947,
“Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which dramatically restricted the power of unions. Unions were interfering
with the smooth functioning of the economy, opponents claimed, and they were acting as extortionate forces, exacting
unreasonable rents from employers.”); id. (“federal labor law has stagnated or ‘ossified’”); Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust
As Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. 378, 388–89 (2020) (“the Chicago School movement . . .
focused on attacking labor union power and, eventually, public coordination of markets. . . . [T]he intellectual arm of
the midcentury attack on labor unions was formulated around the notion of labor monopoly as a distortion of ideal
prices--wages—. . . . [and] appeared as the counterpart in economics of the concurrent political assault on American
unions.”); Michael M. Oswalt, Alt-Bargaining, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 89, 93–94 (2019) (“By the 1960s, labor
was insular, out-of-step with movement politics, and content to coast on its then-historic size.”)
3

See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each Other, 121
YALE L.J. 2216, 2233–35 (2012) (the “economic incoherence” of earlier antitrust decisions “came to an end with the
rise of the ‘Chicago School’ in antitrust economics” in the mid-20th century, as “these scholars demonstrated that
most marketplace conduct was procompetitive and, indeed, pro-consumer.”); D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust’s “Curse of
Bigness” Problem, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1259, 1269–70 (2020) (from 1983 to 2006 “a Reagan Administration-led
‘Chicago’ revolution gave an intellectual basis for courts to loosen antitrust rules significantly.”)
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support from populist conservatives—has returned to labor4 and antitrust.5 So, this is a good time
to absorb lessons from the first big eras of labor and antitrust activism.
Accordingly, this Article re-examines labor history of the Progressive and New Deal eras,
including its antitrust aspects, and shows how those eras produced the labor cartelization and labor
arbitration that endure to this day. More specifically, this Article shows how employers usually
defeated labor unions and maintained employment at will, until the Great Depression’s landmark
labor laws weakened employers’ rights, and encouraged the cartelization of labor, which enabled
labor unions to negotiate agreements replacing at-will employment with arbitration of employee
grievances. In other words, labor grievance arbitration was a major victory for union organizers
after over half a century of intense, often-violent, conflict between workers and employers.

See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2016) (“Economic inequality is at its highest point
since the Gilded Age, when unionization rates were similarly low”); id. at 7–8 (“Since 2012, over two dozen states
and many more localities have raised their minimum wages[, several] to $15 an hour”); id. (“Just a few years ago,
increases of this scope and magnitude would have been unthinkable. The wage laws have been accompanied by new
regulations providing scheduling protection, sick time, and other benefits.”)
4

At first glance, these seem to be ordinary state and local employment statutes, separate and apart
from the law that governs collective activity by workers. But the sea change comes in response to a
range of worker movements, especially the “Fight for $15,” a campaign of low-wage workers
organized by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). The express goal of these
campaigns is not just higher wages but also “a union.” And many of the new laws they have won
are a product of bargaining.
From the efforts of these social movements, the outline of a new labor law is emerging.
Id. See also William A. Herbert & Alicia McNally, Just Cause Discipline for Social Networking in the New Gilded
Age: Will the Law Look the Other Way?, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 381, 381 (2016) (“We live and work in an era
with the moniker of the New Gilded Age to describe the growth in societal income inequality. The appropriateness of
the designation is not limited to empirical evidence of the growing gap in wealth distribution. Another clear emblem
of our age is the sharp rise in employment without security”); Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber As for-Profit Hiring Hall: A
Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 237 (2017) (arguing that regardless
of whether “Uber drivers, or other service providers, are employees or independent contractors . . . , they are entitled
to collective action rights”); id. at 239–40 (in 2015, “the City of Seattle passed an ordinance that grants collective
bargaining rights to drivers . . . who are classified as independent contractors rather than employees”; “In this the
ordinance parallels the basic function and structure of the National Labor Relations Act: it provides a mechanism for
workers to collectively, rather than individually.”)
This is “an exciting time for antitrust with new cries from both the left and right to reinvigorate antitrust as a control
on the abuse of corporate power and its corrosive effect on democratic values.” Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and
Democracy, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 807, 807–08 (2019). See also A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Law and Its Critics,
83 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 269–270 (2020) (“Antitrust law is back in the news and, perhaps for the first time since 1912,
in the presidential campaign. The Federal Trade Commission and various committees of Congress have held hearings
on fundamental antitrust questions. . . . A confluence of four factors seems to have provoked this unrest. The first is a
rising populism, on both the left and the right, that decries free markets, globalism, and increasing inequality within
the developed countries.”)
5
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The first section of this Article contrasts labor grievance arbitration—which was extremely
rare until the 20th century, and remained uncommon until the 1930s—with commercial arbitration,
which occurred throughout U.S. history. Section II of this Article describes how employers in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries kept labor grievance arbitration rare. In other words, Section II
shows that pre-1930s employers generally succeeded in maintaining at-will employment by
refusing to recognize labor unions, let alone agree to unions’ demands to replace at-will
employment with arbitration of employee grievances. Pre-1930s employer successes in defeating
unions, Section II explains, were aided by a range of legal doctrines from the law of master-servant
and tort to the Sherman Antitrust Act and enforcement of workers’ promises not to join unions.
More broadly, this section shows how 19th century classical liberalism extended in the law through
the 1920s to impede unionization, and thus the replacement of employment at will with labor
grievance arbitration.
Section III explains how the Great Depression combined with the early 20th century
ideological shift from classical liberalism to progressivism to produce massive legal changes in
the 1930s. The key legal change was legally-encouraged labor cartelization. This was the economic
policy of the landmark Wagner Act of 1935, the core of what is now known as the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).6 Section III emphasizes that the NLRA’s legally-encouraged labor
cartelization produced labor grievance arbitration by empowering unions to extract from
employers the promises—like firing workers only “for cause”—that create the claims in labor
grievance arbitration, as well as employers’ promises to resolve those claims in arbitration rather
than litigation. Section IV briefly concludes.
A companion article, Labor Grievance Arbitration’s Differences,7 discusses how the law
and practice of labor grievance arbitration differs from other arbitration in the United States. Labor
Grievance Arbitration’s Differences builds on this Article in showing how those differences arose
from labor grievance arbitration’s roots in legally-encouraged cartelization.

National Labor Relations Act., 49 Stat. 449 (1935). The Wagner Act was “the first of three pieces of legislation
commonly known as that National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).” Michael J. Zimmer & Susan Bisom-Rapp, North
American Border Wars: The Role of Canadian and American Scholarship in U.S. Labor Law Reform Debates, 30
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J., 1, 6 (2012).
6

The Wagner Act model was subsequently modified by two major pieces of legislation. The TaftHartley amendments of 1947 shifted the focus of the law from protecting the right of workers to
organize to protecting the choice of workers whether or not to organize. See Taft-Hartley Act, Pub.L.
No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2006)). The
Landrum-Griffin amendments in 1959 were primarily directed at the protection of members of
unions vis-à-vis their unions, including a workers Bill of Rights. See Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006)). The Act is
now known as the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
Id.
Labor Grievance Arbitration’s Differences will be published in a symposium issue of the Cumberland Law Review,
expected in 2021.
7
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I.

MUCH LESS LABOR ARBITRATION
DEAL

THAN

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BEFORE

THE

NEW

In contrast to commercial arbitration, which occurred throughout U.S. history, labor
arbitration was extremely rare until the 20th century, and remained uncommon until the New Deal,
and specifically 1937, when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). While “arbitration” now in the U.S. typically means private (nongovernment) adjudication,8 much of the so-called labor arbitration before the NLRA was not
adjudication at all, but rather was negotiation or mediation. And some of the so-called labor
arbitration before the NLRA that was adjudication was not private adjudication, but rather
adjudication by government or quasi-governmental entities. Accordingly, such adjudication was
not labor arbitration as we understand it but rather early labor regulation, in which government
intervened in some workplaces, typically in a crisis to prevent or resolve strikes. However, a little
labor arbitration, in the modern sense of private adjudication, did appear in the U.S. before the
New Deal, particularly in more progressive industries and regions of the country.
A. Commercial Arbitration
In the 18th and 19th centuries, courts in the United States enforced arbitration awards.9 Until
the 1920s, however, courts did not enforce executory arbitration agreements, that is, contractual
promises to resolve disputes in arbitration rather than litigation. As Imre Szalai’s book on U.S.
arbitration history puts it, “[p]rior to the 1920s, courts in the United States generally refused to
enforce agreements to arbitrate, and such agreements were revocable,” “as long as an arbitrator
had not issued an award.”10 While a pre-1920s breach of an executory arbitration agreement might

8

See, e.g., STEPHEN J. WARE & ARIANA LEVINSON, PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION LAW 1 (2017) (citing authorities);
Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete Legal Framework for
Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 269, 285 (2009) (“Arbitration is private adjudication or private
judging.”); JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT RAU & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 500
(2d ed. 1996) (characterizing arbitration as “the process of private adjudication”); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Adjudication As a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 235 (1979) (“[E]ven today much adjudication is
private (commercial arbitration being an important example).”); THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, PUBLISHER’S VIEW ON
‘THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION’, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., May 2003, at 103 (“The court system, of course,
is almost entirely paid for by taxpayers; whether or not we ever use that public resource, we are subsidizing its use by
others, including private individuals, government entities or corporations. The costs of alternative private adjudication
must also be borne by someone”).
9

This was sometimes done using arbitration bonds. See, e.g., James Oldham & Su Jin Kim, Arbitration in America:
The Early History, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 241, 244 (2013) (“A representative case from the late eighteenth century. . .
[is] Borretts v. Patterson, [in which] The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration, and the arbitration bond recited
the defendant’s agreement to be bound by the decision of named arbitrators, otherwise to forfeit the amount of the
bond.”).
10

IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 9 (2013). See also
IAN MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992).
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result in a court awarding nominal damages of one dollar or so,11 courts did not enforce executory
arbitration agreements with the meaningful remedy of court orders staying litigation and
compelling arbitration.12
Even in the absence of meaningful judicial enforcement though, many parties (often
merchants in the same trade association) agreed to arbitrate and then resolved disputes in
arbitration. Commercial arbitration occurred at each stage of U.S. history, as evidenced by the title
of William Jones’ oft-cited 1956 article, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York:
A Brief Survey.13 Although most 18th and 19th century arbitration likely occurred without
involvement of courts, Jones found in the courts of New York alone about 300 “reports of the
decisions of courts in cases involving arbitration . . . in the period from 1800 to 1920.”14 These
cases involved land boundary disputes, construction, sales of goods, “partnership and agency
agreements with a few employment contracts,” torts “from assault to slander,” fire insurance, and
miscellaneous other disputes.15 Jones concludes “there was a significant amount of arbitration

11

See Munson v. Straits of Dover S. S. Co., 102 F. 926 (2d Cir.1900) (holding that plaintiff, who sought damages in
the form of lawyer’s fees and costs incurred in defending a lawsuit for breach of agreement to arbitrate, was entitled
to nominal damages only).
12

See MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 4.3.2.2 (explaining that in the period 1800–
1920, agreements to arbitrate future disputes were not enforced with remedy of specific performance); WESLEY A.
STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS § 87 (1930). See Kulukundis Shipping Co. S/A v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942).
in the 19th century [U.S.] most courts . . . continued to use the ‘ouster of jurisdiction’ concept: An
executory agreement to arbitrate would not be given specific performance or furnish the basis of a
stay of proceedings on the original cause of action. Nor would it be given effect as a plea in bar,
except in limited instances, i.e., in the case of an agreement expressly or impliedly making it a
condition precedent to litigation that there be an award determining some preliminary question of
subsidiary fact upon which any liability was to be contingent. In the case of broader executory
agreements, no more than nominal dangers would be given for a breach.
Id. at 984 (citations omitted). “Effective state arbitration statutes were enacted beginning with the New York Statute
of 1920.” Id. See also Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31 YALE
L.J. 147, 153 (1921) (“the remedy in damages must be an ineffective remedy in cases where the arbitration had not
been actually entered into, for it would seem difficult to prove any damages other than nominal.”)
13

William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U.
L.Q. 193, 194 (1956).
14

Id. at 193, 212-213 (analyzing reports of cases decided by the New York Supreme Court, the New York Court of
Chancery, the New York Court of Appeals, and the Court of Common Pleas of the City and County of New York).
15

Id. at n. 94:
“Land” cases principally involve boundary disputes; “construction” cases are those involving
contracts to build various structures; “sales” cases involve the sale of goods; “personal contracts”
are chiefly partnership and agency agreements with a few employment contracts; “torts” includes
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throughout the entire period from 1800 to 1920” and “[i]t seems safe to assume . . . that the number
of cases being arbitrated was far greater than the number of arbitrations reviewed or considered in
the courts.”16 Jones reaches this conclusion in part because “use of standard clauses providing for
the arbitration of disputes that might arise under the contract was frequent in the case of leases,
insurance policies, and construction contracts, as well as in the case of contracts for the sale of
goods.”17
Another reason Jones concludes that from 1800 to 1920 far more arbitration in New York
occurred than the 300 cases prompting courts’ decisions is that the “most of these [300] cases do
not involve commercial disputes among merchants.”18 Merchant-versus-merchant arbitration—
likely the most common type of arbitration—typically occurred within trade associations, and such
arbitrations are (in all eras) not likely to appear in courts’ decisions.
[P]arties to trade association arbitration agreements rarely need litigation to
enforce such agreements or to confirm or vacate trade association arbitration
awards because . . . self-interest and private pressures usually induce such parties
to arbitrate and to comply with arbitrators’ decisions. In close-knit trade
associations, . . . merchant parties to trade association arbitration agreements are
often “repeat players” in the same industry and thus eager to remain members in
good standing of their trade association. So they are vulnerable to private
sanctions—culminating in expulsion from the association—if they challenge the
arbitration agreement or award.19
Trade association arbitration “managed to function autonomously before” courts enforced
executory arbitration agreements because trade associations controlled their members’ access to
important customers and thus “were able to inflict sanctions (such as public criticism, fines, and
suspension or termination of membership)”20 for breach of arbitration agreements. Jones recounts
how in 1800s New York,

everything from assault to slander; “insurance” is chiefly fire insurance; “miscellaneous” is various,
including claims owing to one who performed detective work for another and bastardy claims;
“unknown” refers to those cases in which it is impossible to determine from the report of the case
the subject matter of the dispute.
16

Id. at 213.

17

Id. at 214.

18

Id. at 213.

19

STEPHEN J. WARE & ALAN SCOTT RAU, ARBITRATION 33 (4th ed. 2020).

C.J.W. Baaij, Hiding in Plain Sight: The Power of Public Governance in International Arbitration, 60 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 135, 164–66 (2019).
20

25

merchants started to organize according to the commodity in which they dealt. In
each of these organizations there was provision for the arbitration of disputes
among its members.
The first of these was the New York Stock Exchange. . . . In its first constitution in
1817, . . . there was provision for arbitration of disputes among members. There
has continued to be arbitration up to the present day. . . .
Another exchange which had arbitration from an early period was the New York
Produce Exchange. . . .
Other exchanges were formed as the century wore on, such as the Cotton Exchange
in 1871, the Mercantile Exchange in 1882, and the New York Coffee and Sugar
Exchange in 1885. All had provisions for arbitration in their charters.
In addition to exchanges where merchants dealing in a particular commodity could
deal with each other, merchants engaged in the same trade began, towards the end
of the [19th] century, to organize into associations for the advancement of the
interests of that trade. These associations made various efforts to regulate the
particular trade, such as establishing standard grades and form contracts. Many of
them also provided in their bylaws for the arbitration, sometimes compulsory, of
disputes among members.
It is believed that this development of arbitration both within exchanges, and
especially within trade associations, has continued to increase to the present day.
Such, at any rate, is the conclusion towards which the research that the University
of Chicago Law School is presently undertaking seems to be tending.21
The last sentence of that passage apparently references Soia Mentchikoff’s long-influential 1961
article, Commercial Arbitration,22 which details her “empirical study of trade association
arbitration and her comparison of such industry-specific arbitration, with the more general
commercial arbitration exemplified by the American Arbitration Association (AAA).”23
While commercial arbitration from 1800-1920 was especially prevalent in New York,
many arbitration cases from around the country during those years are cited in Wesley Sturges’

21

Jones, supra note 13, at 217-18.

22

Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961).

23

Stephen J. Ware, Private Ordering and Commercial Arbitration: Lasting Lessons from Mentschikoff, 2019 J. OF
DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 (2019).

26

1930 treatise, Commercial Arbitration and Awards.24 In sum, despite pre-1920s courts’ refusal to
enforce executory arbitration agreements, commercial arbitration occurred with some frequency
at each stage of U.S. history. This longstanding prevalence of commercial arbitration was largely
due to commercial parties often preferring arbitration to litigation, and to private (often trade
association) enforcement of arbitration agreements. These factors were, in contrast, largely absent
in the labor context. The next subsection shows that labor grievance arbitration was extremely rare
until the 20th century, and remained uncommon until the 1930s. And the rest of this Article shows
why: employers nearly always resist recognizing labor unions, let alone agree to unions’ demands
to replace at-will employment with arbitration of employee grievances. Employers were largely
successful in this resistance, until the New Deal’s legally-encouraged labor cartelization pressured
employers into labor grievance arbitration.
B. Labor Grievance Arbitration was Uncommon Before the New Deal
1. Different Meanings of Labor “Arbitration” in the 1800s
While a significant amount of commercial arbitration occurred at each stage of U.S.
history, labor arbitration was extremely rare until the 20th century. Although arbitration now
typically means private (non-government) adjudication,25 most so-called labor arbitration before
1900 was not adjudication at all, but rather was negotiation or mediation. And some of the socalled labor arbitration before 1900 that was adjudication was not private adjudication, but rather
adjudication by government or quasi-governmental entities. Such adjudication was not labor
arbitration but rather an early form of labor regulation, that is, a form of government intervention
in some workplaces, often deployed by elected officials in a crisis to prevent or resolve strikes.
Although a founder of the American Arbitration Association26 wrote that “[o]ne of the first
disputes submitted to the earliest known American arbitration tribunal, organized in 1786 . . .,
involved the wages of seamen,”27 and another history says “the first mention of arbitration in labor

24

WESLEY A. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS (1930). See also Sabra A. Jones, Historical
Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 248 (1928) (“In the United States
in 1916 there were about 6,000 commercial, industrial, and trading organizations. . . . In the sixth edition of
‘Commercial Industrial Organizations of the United States’ we find approximately 9,000 organizations, covering
national, international, state, and local areas. Of these probably 200, seeing the practicability of arbitration, made their
own rules on arbitration and in many, if not most instances, proceeded independently of the state statutes. Especially
was this true of the associations with a national or larger scope.”).
25

See supra note 8.

26

Sandra K. Partridge, Frances Kellor and the American Arbitration Association, 67 DISP. RESOL. J., 1, 16, 17 (2012).

27

FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION, ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 4 (1948). See also
KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 185
(1991) (arbitration proceedings “In colonial America . . . had been widely used to determine compensation in
workmen’s suites for back wages”).

27

matters in this country occurred” as early as 1829,28 such statements, devoid of context, can
mislead. As legal historians have long cautioned, “it is difficult to trace the beginnings of labor
arbitration in the United States because the term has been used to connote quite different things.”29
While arbitration in the United States now typically means private (non-government)
adjudication,30 in the labor context of the 1800s, arbitration “[i]n its earliest stage . . . meant what
we would now call ‘collective bargaining,’ and at subsequent stages it often meant what we would
now call either ‘mediation’ or ‘conciliation.’”31 So, although 19th century labor unions sought, as
the Knights of Labor put it, “to persuade all employers to agree to arbitrate all differences which
may arise between them and their employees, in order that . . . strikes may be rendered unnecessary,
the ‘arbitration’ advocated was merely union recognition by employers to the extent of
negotiations and agreements on conditions of employment.”32 “For most of the nineteenth century,
‘arbitration’ was interchangeably described as negotiation undertaken in a conciliatory spirit,
adjudication by a joint labor management body, and referral to a neutral third party.”33
Some of that “referral to a neutral third party” apparently was labor arbitration as we now
understand it—private adjudication, albeit pursuant to a post-dispute (rather than pre-dispute)
arbitration agreement. Dennis Nolan and Roger Abrams write:
One of the first recorded cases involving arbitration of collective bargaining
disputes by neutral outsiders took place in 1871. The Pennsylvania anthracite coal
mining industry and union selected Judge William Elwell to settle disputes
concerning interference with the works and the firing of workers because of their
union connections. Holding that both sides had erred, the arbitrator’s decision must
have been satisfactory because they later let him decide the “bill of wages.”

In fact, “the first mention of arbitration in labor matters in this country occurred in the Constitution of the
Journeymen Cabinet-Makers of the City of Philadelphia in 1829.” EDWIN E. WITTE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR
ARBITRATION (1953).
28

29

R. W. Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1963) (quoting
Witte).
30

See supra note 8.

31

Fleming, supra note 29, at 1247; WITTE, supra note 28, at 4.

32

WITTE, supra note 28, at 6. According to a 1983 assessment by labor arbitration scholars Dennis Nolan and Roger
Abrams, “no definitive history of labor arbitration in the United States has yet been written,” but Witte’s monograph
was “the standard work to which all students of the subject must refer.” Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American
Labor Arbitration: The Early Years, 35 FLA. L. REV. 373, 374 (1983). Witte was “a University of Wisconsin economist
steeped in that state’s progressive politics,” and called “the father of Social Security.” Patrick J. Kiger, Edwin E. Witte,
AARP,
https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/history/champions-of-aging-photos/older-american-edwin-wittefather-social-security/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
33

Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 375.

28

Three years later another judge was selected to arbitrate a wage rate dispute
in the Ohio coal industry.34
If these were in fact examples of labor arbitration as we now understand it, (private adjudication),
then these 19th century labor arbitrations were extremely rare exceptions in an era almost totally
devoid of labor arbitration. In other words, labor grievance arbitration replacing at-will
employment had not yet occurred in the 19th century because nearly all employers refused to
recognize labor unions or to form enforceable agreements replacing at-will employment with
arbitration of employee grievances. Such agreements would not come until the 1900s, and not in
large numbers until 1930s legislation gave cartel powers to unions and thus pressured employers
to contract with unions.
While labor grievance arbitration was virtually non-existent in the 1800s, what did occur
in the late 1800s was the advent of state labor boards. While often called “boards of arbitration,”35
most of what these state labor boards did was mediation, not adjudication.36 And even when state
labor boards adjudicated, (usually ineffectively,37) they were not providing private adjudication
(arbitration, as we know understand it,) because they were generally appointed by governmental
bodies, such as courts.38 By contrast, commercial arbitration throughout the 1800s was truly
private adjudication—generally conducted by private arbitrators selected ad hoc by the parties or
provided, not by government, but by a private trade association.39 So rather than think of 19th
century state labor boards as early labor arbitration, we might better see them as early labor
regulation, in which government intervened in some workplaces, often in a crisis to prevent or
resolve strikes.40

34

Id. at 379.

35

Id. at 380-81; WITTE, supra note 28, at 6.

36

WITTE, supra note 28, at 6.

State labor boards had a “general record of ineffectiveness,” according to Witte, supra note 28, at 12. Concurring,
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Nineteenth century state labor boards’ ad hoc government intervention into particular workplaces may be contrasted
with today’s more systemic government regulation by agency rulemaking and administrative adjudication. Such
systemic government regulation of the workplace emanates from the National Labor Relations Board, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and other federal and state
agencies. But federal workplace regulation continues to include an ad hoc component much like the 19 th century state
labor boards—the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. It refers to its mediators’ “critical ‘firefighter’ function,
arriving at the last moment to assist the parties in resolving a contract dispute.” Federal Mediation & Conciliation
Service, Building Labor-Management Relationships,
https://www.fmcs.gov/services/building-labor-management-relationships/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
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The federal government similarly responded to strikes in important industries by
encouraging “arbitration” to restore or maintain labor peace, and thus production, in those
industries. “Reacting to a drastic increase in strikes, President Grover Cleveland recommended to
Congress in 1886 the creation of a permanent board for voluntary arbitration of railroad labor
disputes. Instead Congress passed the Arbitration Act of 1888, providing for ad hoc arbitration
boards which parties could use if they so agreed.”41 However, “the voluntary arbitration provisions
of this act were not utilized even once during the ten years that it was in effect.”42 After the Pullman
strike “crippled the American railroad network in 1894,”43 Congress enacted the Erdman Act of
1898. It obligated federal officials
on the request of at least one of the [railway] parties, to attempt to settle through
mediation any existing or threatened labor dispute. The act further provided for
arbitration, on agreement of both parties, by an ad hoc board composed of a
representative of each side and a third person agreed upon by these representatives,
or appointed, in the event of their failure to agree, by the two federal officials having
primary responsibility for the administration of the Act.
Soon after the passage of the Erdman Act, the Railroad Trainmen invoked
the law in connection with a dispute involving switching service in the Pittsburgh
area. The [U.S. Government’s] Commissioner of Labor and the Chairman of the
Interstate Commerce Commission promptly offered their services as mediators.
These services were declined by the railroads with a statement that wages were
such a vital matter to them that they could not accept outside intervention.
Thereafter no further attempt to use the Erdman Act was made until late in 1906. 44
From 1906 until 1913, seven “arbitrations” occurred under the Erdman Act, but as Nolan and
Abrams explain, “[t]he two arbitrators selected by the parties seldom agreed as to the third. As a
result, the task of choosing the third arbitrator generally devolved upon the Commissioner of Labor
and the Chairman of the ICC.”45 So these so-called “arbitrations” were, not private adjudication,
as we define arbitration today, but crucially governmental.
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Similar to railroads, other industries around 1900 sent a few labor disputes to what was
called “arbitration,” but even some of those few were not private adjudication because government
officials served as, or appointed, the “arbitrators.” For instance, what Edwin Witte calls “the most
famous of all arbitration cases” “was the settlement by arbitration of the anthracite coal strike of
1902.”46 The coal companies “absolutely refused to deal with the union,”47 and the strike “of more
than five months’ duration aroused a vast amount of public concern.”48 “After the strike had
continued for some time with no prospect of settlement, President Theodore Roosevelt threatened
to have the United States Army take over the mines and operate them as a receivership. The mine
owners bowed to the pressure and asked the President to establish a strike commission.”49
J. Pierpont Morgan finally acceded to the suggestion that all issues be submitted for
settlement to a board to be appointed by the President, all of whose members should
represent the public. The Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, after months of
hearings, came up with an award in which the union failed to win recognition but
did secure its major economic demand, namely, a basic nine-hour day at the same
pay as for the prior ten-hour day. The award also provided for the establishment of
grievance machinery and for a permanent bipartisan Anthracite Conciliation Board
to interpret the award in cases of dispute. . . .
...
In twenty-five cases in the first nine years of the functioning of the board, . . . a
decision had to be made by an umpire. In all but one of these cases the umpire was
the United States Commissioner of Labor.50
Decisions by the United States Commissioner of Labor are plainly governmental, rather than
private adjudication, and thus not arbitration as we now understand it. Instead, the Anthracite
Conciliation Board is—like the earlier-discussed state labor boards and the railroad interventions
of the Commissioner of Labor and ICC Chair—better understood as early labor regulation, by
which government intervened in some workplaces, often in a crisis to prevent or resolve strikes.
Such governmental regulation by the federal government coming earlier to railroads and
coal than to other industries fits the importance—including importance to interstate commerce—
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of railroads and coal in that era.51 So reducing rail and coal strikes understandably concerned
federal officials and the broader public. Federal government efforts to regulate these industries
grew along with growing public “[s]entiment for restrictions upon the right to strike, at least on
the railroads.”52 Accordingly, in a renewed federal effort to prevent or resolve railroad strikes, the
Newlands Act of 1913 established a Board of Mediation and Conciliation. Although Witte says
the Board was “instrumental in bringing about settlements through arbitration in twenty-one
cases,” this so-called “arbitration” was again not private adjudication, but rather, as Witte
acknowledges, “an independent permanent government agency.”53 Moreover, “the prestige of the
agency waned after it had to appeal twice in the first three years of its existence to the President to
prevent threatened strikes.”54 In 1916, on the eve of a nationwide railroad strike, President Wilson
called in representatives of the parties and recommended the establishment of a
basic eight hour day for train service employees. . . . When the carriers refused to
go along, the President recommended that Congress pass a law to carry out his
recommendations. . . . Congress promptly passed the Adamson Act, which served
to avert the threatened nation-wide strike.55
In short, the so-called labor “arbitration” that was by World War I “very popular with the general
public,” was not private adjudication, but government regulation—and sometimes even
presidential intervention—“for the settlement of strikes or threatened strikes.”56
Similar government intervention occurred during the First World War and in the 1920s.
Witte reports that “[r]elative to the number of industrial workers, the number of strikes and the
man-days lost through strikes from 1916 to 1919 were the greatest in all our history.” 57 During
these war years, the federal government established “[m]ore than a dozen new labor dispute
adjustment agencies” to mediate labor disputes. “[W]hen mediation failed to bring about a
settlement, the adjustment boards passed on the merits of the dispute and entered awards. When
necessary, indirect methods of compulsion were resorted to by the Government to secure
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compliance.”58 President Wilson created a National War Labor Board with “authority to intervene
in any labor dispute affecting war production and not within the jurisdiction of a special adjustment
agency. Adjustment of such disputes was to be sought through mediation or by getting the parties
to agree to arbitration or, failing in such efforts, to render a decision outlining a basis for
settlement.” 59 Witte says, “Up to the Armistice, the National War Labor Board rendered eightythree decisions, which resembled arbitration awards.” 60 Yet again, this so-called arbitration was
not arbitration as we know it because it was government, rather than private, adjudication.
After World War I, strikes exploded. “1919 stands out as the worst year for strikes” in U.S.
history.61 According to Witte, “[p]ublic concern was high over the many serious strikes, and
compulsory arbitration received more support than ever before.”62 By “compulsory arbitration,”
Witte means governmentally-mandated. Strong public sentiment against strikes, Witte says, meant
“the Government necessarily had to bring great pressure upon the parties to settle by arbitration
strikes seriously alarming to the public. Commissions named by President Wilson arbitrated the
nationwide bituminous coal strike of 1919 and the threatened anthracite strike of 1920.”63 So here
again, as earlier, this so-called “arbitration” was not private adjudication but rather government
intervention in an important industry—perhaps amounting to temporary government regulation of
wages and working conditions in that industry—in a crisis to prevent or resolve strikes.
Strikes were such a widespread source of public concern that several states not only
prohibited strikes but made striking a criminal offence. “The mildest of these was the Colorado
Disputes Investigation Act” of 1915, which “rendered unlawful strikes in [some] industries, prior
to investigation and reports by the state industrial commission. This legal restriction was often
violated, and from 1919 to 1922 several prosecutions” occurred.64 “Much more drastic was the
Kansas Industrial Relations Court Act of 1920,” under which
Strikes were outlawed under criminal penalties and made subject to prohibition by
injunction. Compulsory arbitration was provided for all labor disputes in the public
utility, coal, food, and clothing industries. Enforcement of the law and the
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settlement by binding decisions of all labor disputes in the specified industries was
the function of the Court of Industrial Relations . . . .
The compulsory arbitration statute was in actual operation in Kansas for a
little more than three very stormy years. The Act was strongly opposed by
organized labor and openly defied by many unions . . . . Some employers also
refused to abide by the decisions of the Court, and it was out of one of these cases
that there came decisions in 1923 and 1924 by the United States Supreme Court
holding the Kansas act to be unconstitutional.65
Kansas’s attempt to ban strikes in some industries and instead mandate governmental arbitration
was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held, because government setting wages in meatpacking
(or “food preparation”) unconstitutionally “deprives [the employer] of its property and liberty of
contract without due process of law.”66 In contrast, the Court distinguished industries, such as
railroads, “where fear of monopoly prompted, and was held to justify, regulation of rates.”67
In sum, labor arbitration as we know it—private adjudication—was extremely rare in the
19th century, and much of what was called “arbitration” was actually negotiation, mediation, or
governmental adjudication. In the 1800s and early 1900s, much so-called labor arbitration was
actually early labor regulation, that is, government intervention in important industries, often to
prevent or resolve strikes.
2.

Labor Grievance Arbitration Still Uncommon in the Early 1900s

While private adjudication of labor disputes, as noted above, may have occurred in a few
extremely rare 19th century instances, the more recognize-able beginnings of labor grievance
arbitration as the private adjudication we know occurred in the early 1900s. This is when
employers began to recognize unions, and to form arbitration agreements with them. Nolan and
Abrams write that the “first major newspaper industry agreement incorporating an arbitration
provision” was signed in 1901,68 and “hailed by” David Weiss, a member of the International
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Typographical Union, “as ‘the genesis of industrial arbitration agreements in the United States.’”69
In the 1910s, strike settlements in the clothing industries led many employers to recognize unions
and agree to arbitrate employee grievances. For instance, “a great strike in the New York cloak
and suit industry in 1910” was settled “very largely through the efforts of” progressive icon and
future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who “for four years . . . served as the unpaid, parttime chairman of the arbitration board under this agreement.”70 Labor arbitration agreements in
various parts of the clothing industries spread to other major cities over the next few years.71 In
addition, “the American Association of Street Railway Employees included arbitration clauses in
its collective agreements early in the [20th] century,” and “[i]n 1917, the Actor’s Equity
Association negotiated an arbitration clause in its first contract.”72
“In short, little activity before World War I could be characterized as modern grievance
arbitration, but the groundwork had been laid.”73 The American Federation of Labor grew tenfold
from 1898 to 1919.74 In 1913, the U.S. Department of Labor came into existence.75 However, after
World War I, unionism and the AFL’s membership declined.76 During the post-World War I “red
scare,” coinciding with the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, many U.S. “labor radicals, pacifists,
socialists, and other left-wingers [were] jailed or deported.”77 Deportation is quite relevant as “[b]y
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1910, twenty-two percent of the U.S. labor force was foreign-born,”78 and many labor activists
were immigrants.79
While the newspaper, clothing, construction, and railroad industries moved toward
unionization and arbitration in the early 20th century, most other industries did not, and overall
union membership declined in the conservative 1920s. As Witte recounts:
Before the great depression, labor-management agreements existed in nearly all
unionized industries. On the railroads, in the building trades, in clothing
manufacture, in printing, and in a few smaller industries, union contracts were
common. [In contrast, t]he mass-production industries, in fact nearly all
manufacturing as well as substantially all service industries, distribution, retailing,
and office employments, were almost completely unorganized. In coal and metal
mining, unionism earlier had been very strong, but was greatly weakened in the
nineteen-twenties. Street railway transportation was often unionized, but trucking
and taxi and bus service were organized only in some of the larger cities.80
Witte concludes that “[f]rom above five million in 1919, union membership decreased to less than
three million in 1933.”81 During the business-oriented era of the three Republican presidencies
from 1920 through 1933, the number of strikes plummeted.82 These were such lean years for labor
unions that Professor Irving Bernstein’s book is entitled, The Lean Years: A History of the
American Worker 1920-1933.83
Nevertheless, “[f]rom the end of World War I to the coming of the New Deal,” R.W.
Fleming writes, “there appears to have been a modest, but unspectacular, growth in grievance
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arbitration.”84 However, some of this growth came from the government-mandated arbitration of
the Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA). Although, as discussed above, Kansas’s attempt to ban
strikes in some industries and instead mandate arbitration was held unconstitutional after just a
few controversial years,85 the RLA is an analogous federal statute from that era, and it has now
endured nearly a century. The RLA bans strikes in some transportation industries and instead
mandates arbitration.86 “The RLA creates a National Railroad Adjustment Board consisting of
representatives selected by the employers and representatives selected by the employees’ labor
unions. The RLA requires employers and unions to submit certain disputes to the Adjustment
Board for decision.”87
II.

HOW PRE-1930S EMPLOYERS LARGELY DEFEATED LABOR UNIONS’ EFFORTS TO REPLACE
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT WITH ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES

Section I of this Article showed that labor arbitration was virtually non-existent before
1900 and that labor grievance arbitration remained uncommon through the 1920s. In other words,
employment at will was not often replaced by arbitration of employee grievances before the 1930s.
This Section shows that pre-1930s employers generally succeeded in maintaining at-will
employment by refusing to recognize labor unions, let alone agree to unions’ demands to replace
at-will employment with arbitration of employee grievances. Pre-1930s employer successes in
defeating unions, this Section explains, were aided by a range of legal doctrines from the law of
master-servant and tort to the Sherman Antitrust Act and enforcement of workers’ promises not to
join unions. More broadly, this Section shows how 19th century classical liberalism extended in
the law through the 1920s to impede unionization, and thus the replacement of employment at will
with labor grievance arbitration.
A. Master-Servant and Torts

Fleming, supra note 29, at 1248. See also Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at, 400 (noting “although one study
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While few contemporary employees are legally-obligated to remain with their employers
for a period of time,88 before and into the 19th century many workers were “servants” more tied to
their “masters.” Some of these jobs “were often quite personal and intimate,” such as “the
employment relations between masters and their domestic servants.”89 The “status relations” of
master-servant “were governed by a well-developed set of legal rules. For example, a master was
obliged to provide food, shelter, and security for his servant, while the servant in return was
expected to provide personal service. Servants were legally identified with their masters, and so
possessed little individuality and personal independence.”90
If such an employee (“servant”) quit that employer (“master”), before completing the
agreed period of employment, to take a different job then the master might well have a successful
tort action against the person(s) who enticed the servant to leave.91
The law strengthened a master’s control over his servants by preventing others from
interfering with the relationship during the term of service. An action for enticement
was available against a third party who persuaded a servant to leave his employment
before the expiration of his term, while an action for harboring could be lodged
against any person who continued to employ a runaway servant after receiving
notice of his premature departure from another servitude. These suits sought to deny
servants any opportunity for alternative employment during the term of their
service. Unable to feed themselves or their families if they left their masters,
servants had little choice but to obey them for the duration of the agreement.92
The 1853 English case of Lumley v. Gye93 expanded this tort beyond household servants to a
famous opera singer. “‘Miss Wagner, an opera singer of some distinction, had agreed with the
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plaintiff to sing in his theatre for a definite term and during that term not to sing elsewhere,’ but
the defendant, ‘intending to injure plaintiff,’ before the expiration of the term, enticed and procured
Miss Wagner to refuse to perform, as a result of which Miss Wagner failed to sing for the
plaintiff.”94 In Lumley v. Gye’s companion case, Lumley v. Wagner, the court enjoined Wagner
from “singing at any competing music hall for the term of the contract.”95 Lumley’s expansion of
“the action of enticement” beyond “employment relationships that were domestic, personal, and
paternalistic,” occurred as industrialization shifted employment from “the paternalistic masterservant relation of the eighteenth century [to] the depersonalized industrial employment contract
of the late nineteenth century.”96
From England, the tort of enticement emigrated to the United States,97 and law in most
states followed Lumley, so “the distinction between domestic servants and other employees
gradually disappeared from the law of third-party inducement; the enticement action became
available to all employers whose employees were persuaded to leave their service.”98 This meant
employers could use the enticement action against third parties “enticing industrial employees and
other workers” to leave their jobs.99 Thus, John Nockleby explains, in 1871 “the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court extended the enticement action to workers engaged in the manufacture of
boots” and “the Georgia Supreme Court applied the action to sharecroppers.”100
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However, some courts held liable for enticement only defendants who induced breach of a
contract for “exclusive personal services for a specified period of time.”101 These courts held “that
no action for enticement can be brought where the service was at will”102 because such an
employee does not breach an employment contract by quitting. For instance, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts said in Beekman v. Marsters in 1907:
If a defendant by an offer of higher wages induces a laborer who is not under
contract to enter his (the defendant’s) employ in place of the plaintiff’s, the plaintiff
is not injured in his legal rights. But it is quite a different thing if the laborer was
under a contract with the plaintiff for a period which had not expired, and the
defendant, knowing that, intentionally induced the laborer to leave the plaintiff’s
employ by an offer of higher wages, to get his (the laborer’s) services for his (the
defendant’s) benefit.103
Much industrial employment was at-will in the late 18th and early 19th centuries,104 so employers
could not—in jurisdictions that found no breach by an employee leaving at-will employment—use
the enticement tort to enjoin union organizers attempting to recruit such employees to leave their
employers, even if just temporarily, by striking.
Unfortunately for labor union organizers, however, courts broadened the tort from
“enticement” to “malicious interference.” John Nockleby writes that in the 1881 English Court of
Appeals held “that ‘malicious interference,’ not ‘enticement,’ provided the foundation for the
tort,”105 and courts in the United States followed. Significantly for employers’ actions against
union organizers, “unlike the action of enticement, ‘malicious’ interference did not presuppose
that the defendant had appropriated the fruits of the contract to himself. Thus, ‘interference’
encompassed a broader range of forbidden behavior that conceivably included any intentional act
that devalued the worth of a plaintiff’s contractual interest regardless of whether the defendant
personally obtained the benefits the plaintiff lost.”106
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For instance, in the 1896 case of Vegelahn v. Guntner,107 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court enjoined union organizers from maintaining a picket line outside the plaintiffemployer’s business.108 The Vegelahn court said the picket or “patrol”:
was maintained as one of the means of carrying out the defendants’ plan, and it was
used in combination with social pressure, threats of personal injury or unlawful
harm, and persuasion to break existing contracts. It was thus one means of
intimidation, indirectly to the plaintiff, and directly to persons actually employed,
or seeking to be employed, by the plaintiff, and of rendering such employment
unpleasant or intolerable to such persons. Such an act is an unlawful interference
with the rights both of employer and of employed. An employer has a right to
engage all persons who are willing to work for him, at such prices as may be
mutually agreed upon, and persons employed or seeking employment have a
corresponding right to enter into or remain in the employment of any person or
corporation willing to employ them. These rights are secured by the constitution
itself.109
This passage from Vegelahn shows the court’s understanding of the union’s picket as a tool
designed to prevent the employer from hiring workers not represented by the union. In other words,
successful picketing pressures the employer, as elaborated below, to buy labor only from workers
represented by the union. And Vegelahn exemplifies how pre-1930s employers used the law of
tort—rooted in the older law of master and servant—to enjoin picketing and thus preserve
employers’ freedom to buy labor from workers not represented by the union. Consequently, in
cases like Vegelahn, “between 1890 and 1920, the tort of interference with contractual relations
became an intellectual battleground corresponding to the daily reality of struggle between labor
unions and capitalist employers.”110 “In the end,” Nockleby notes, it was the New Deal’s Wagner
Act “and the creation of the National Labor Relations Board that put an end to much of the
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controversy over the tort in the employment context.”111 The Wagner Act reduced the relevance
of this tort of interference because, as discussed in Section III, the Wagner Act encouraged the
formation of unions and pressured employers to buy labor from workers represented by unions.
Thus, the Wagner Act greatly reduced the ability of employers to do what the Vegelahn employer
did—buy labor from workers not represented by the union.
B. Antitrust Law Prohibiting Cartels, Including Labor Cartels
1. The Sherman Act and the Growth of Labor Injunctions
Efforts to form effective labor unions were impeded not only by master-servant and tort
law, but also by antitrust law, which applied to both capital and labor. The “dramatic expansion of
industrial and commercial enterprise” in the late 1800s “witnessed the intensive concentration of
industrial capital. Goliath enterprises came to dominate entire industries.”112 In addition to
concerns about the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few “robber barons,”113
the growth of industries with only a few producers led by the end of the 19th century to concerns
that a monopolist or—through a price-fixing agreement—cartel can profit by raising its price
above that which sellers in a competitive market would charge.114 (This general view of monopoly
pricing above competitive pricing remains standard economics.115)
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“In 1890, Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics was the first economics treatise to incorporate terms
like elasticity of demand and marginal revenue in a way that permitted technical descriptions of price and output under
competition and monopoly. After that, the classical model of ‘perfect competition’ developed fairly quickly, maturing
in the 1920s.” Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919, 936
(1988).
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While during most of the 19th century, “[t]he common law’s general rule . . . was that
agreements to fix prices were in restraint of trade, and consequently a court would not enforce
them,”116 such agreements “were not unlawful in the sense of being criminal or tortious.”117 This
changed in 1890 when Congress enacted the Sherman Act, which prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”118
The Sherman Act “granted the federal government the right to seek injunctions against business
cartels and even to levy fines or prison sentences against cartel participants.”119 Courts “began
condemning simple price-fixing agreements” in 1897.120
“During the late nineteenth century, political economists . . . explained how concerted
activity could be harmful simply because it was carried out by a group that collectively dominated
some market.”121 They applied this theory first to business cartels and then to labor
combinations.122 Law treatise writers and courts, Herbert Hovenkamp explains, often followed a
similar path. “Perhaps the most striking aspect of the labor law literature of the late nineteenth
century is the similar way in which treatise writers approached combinations of laborers and
combinations of producers or sellers.”123 At the turn of the 20th century, Hovenkamp goes so far
to say, “the consumer welfare principle of protecting consumers from higher prices was not merely
the predominant labor law policy, it was the only policy.”124 Hovenkamp explains that “Beginning
gradually around 1890, courts began to adopt the theory that labor is a commodity, and that the
‘labor and skill of the workman’ and the ‘plant of the manufacturer’ are equally property, to which
the same set of legal rules should apply.”125

116

Hovenkamp, supra note 114, at 932.

117

Id. at 924 (quoting United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211
(1899)). The “well known Addyston Pipe decision” was authored by not-yet “Justice William Howard Taft, the
greatest contemporary scholar of the relationship between the Sherman Act and the common law of trade restraints.”
Id. at 933 and 951.
118

15 U.S.C. § 1.

119

Hovenkamp, supra note 114, at 962.

120

Id. at 949.

121

Id. at 924.

122

Id. at 924.

123

Id. at 925.

124

Id. at 928.

125

Id. at 926.

43

This view of labor “as a commodity to be bought and sold like any other”126 “implied a
problematic role for unions. If workers were commodity sellers, then unions were cartels of
commodity sellers, or ‘labor trusts.’”127 Courts held “that labor combinations could be ‘in restraint
of trade’ under the antitrust laws.”128 The Sherman Act’s application to labor cartels significantly
increased courts’ use of injunctions, which could “bind thousands of workers,”129 against strikes
and other union activity. Between 1890, when the Sherman Act was passed, and 1897, lower courts
found antitrust violations in thirteen reported decisions; one involved a manufacturers’ conspiracy,
while twelve involved labor union conspiracies.130 In short, “all interested parties immediately
perceived the [Sherman Act] as a powerful union-busting device.”131
Before the Sherman Act, Hovenkamp writes, “workers had the right to refuse to work,
either singly or in combination, as long as they neither coerced other employees to join them nor
forced other businesses to refuse to deal with the struck employer.”132 Hovenkamp found that “no
American case before the 1890s condemned laborers for the simple act of combining in order to
increase wages.”133 By contrast, “[a] principal effect of applying the Sherman Act to labor
combinations” was that courts began “scrutinizing strikes very closely for evidence of the coercion
of unwilling participants. Moreover, conduct not generally considered coercive in the 1870s and
1880s, such as simple picketing, became so after the turn of the century.”134
In contrast to cartels of businesses, cartels of unskilled labor may be harder to maintain,
particularly when employers can, as they often did around 1900, replace “striking unskilled
laborers” with “carloads of ‘scabs’ [replacement workers] within a day or two after a strike

James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 984–86 (1997) (“From the 1890s to the
1930s, most courts joined employers in assimilating industrial relations to the narrative model of the commercial
transaction: rationally self-interested workers would seek to maximize their wages and working conditions by
exercising their freedom to contract in the labor market. Continuing a middle-class abolitionist tradition, labor was
viewed as a commodity to be bought and sold like any other.”)
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began.”135 Consequently, many unions’ strike goals included the “closed shop,” a workplace where
union membership is a condition of employment. However, this “closed shop campaign tended to
confirm . . . that the labor movement threatened to monopolize the labor market . . . in a certain
plant by denying nonunion workers an opportunity to sell their services there.”136 With closed
shops out of labor’s reach and unskilled laborers on strike easily replaced by other workers, strikes’
effectiveness “often required secondary activities that a court might find coercive.”137
For the unions, various kinds of secondary activities were necessary. One
example is simple picketing, which is intended to intimidate customers and
nonparticipating employees of the struck employer. These activities also may
involve more forceful acts—boycotts of those unsympathetic with the strike, such
as retailers who sell struck goods, and even violence directed at workers who refuse
to participate. An important but often overlooked fact about some great early labor
conspiracy cases . . . is that the complainants were not employers seeking to
discipline unions, but were fellow employees whom union members had attempted
to exclude from the labor market because of their willingness to work at too low a
wage.138
Hovenkamp writes that “Violence was of course criminal without regard to any underlying
conspiracy among laborers and their unions. Nevertheless, striking laborers were inclined to think
that they had a right, whether moral or legal, to take action against those who would undermine
their strike.”139 “Most early Sherman Act labor cases involved secondary activities that were
sufficiently coercive to warrant condemnation even under a common-law standard. These
activities included union violence or intimidation against others and seizure or physical destruction
of an employer’s property.”140 “Some courts eventually held that even a simple agreement to strike
was illegal and enjoinable under the antitrust laws.”141
In sum, the Sherman Act “crippled organized labor’s use of its chief economic weapons—
strikes and secondary boycotts.”142 “The federal labor injunction proved to be the courts’ ideal
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weapon for subduing labor activities.”143 “Of the many weapons employed in industrial warfare,
none has aroused more controversy than the labor injunction. Commencing about 1886, and
continuing through the 1920’s, injunctions had an important and frequently a decisive effect on
the outcome of disputes between employers and unions.”144 Opposition to “government by
injunction” was central to early 20th century progressives and New Dealers, including future
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.145
2. The Clayton Act’s Limited Impact
The 1912 Democratic Party platform promised to exempt labor from the Sherman Act.146
Democrats won the presidency and both houses of Congress that year. The new, progressive
Congress designed the Clayton Act of 1914 to exempt labor organizing from the federal antitrust
laws.147 Section 6 of the Clayton Act declares:
The labor of human beings is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor . . . organizations . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor
shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under antitrust laws.148
Section 20 of the Clayton Act forbade labor injunctions “in any case between an employer and
employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons
employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning
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terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or
to a property right.”149 However, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted this language to protect
only “acts growing out of labor disputes between employees and their immediate employer,” so
“although labor organizations themselves were not illegal and in some cases strikes also were not,
secondary boycotts and, in many circumstances, strikes and picketing, remained subject to antitrust
liability.”150
Consequently, labor injunctions based on antitrust claims continued through the 1920s.151
An example was the big national strike of railroad workers in 1922. “At the behest of President
Warren Harding, Attorney General Harry Daugherty sought an injunction against the strike, a court
granted it, and 2,200 new federal marshals were hired to enforce it. The injunction crushed the
strike as workers were not only barred from striking but also picketing and assembling near rail
lines.”152 In the 1927 Supreme Court case of Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’
Ass’n of North America, an employer’s use of non-union labor led the stone cutters union to declare
a nationwide boycott on the handling of the employer’s “unfair” (non-union) stone.153 The
employer sought an injunction against the union’s officers to prevent them from ordering their
members to refrain from working on the non-union stone and from persuading customers and other
workers to refrain from using the non-union stone.154 While the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court’s refusal to issue the injunction,155 the Supreme Court held the employers “[were]
entitled to relief by injunction under section 16 of the Clayton Act” 156 because “the acts and
conduct of respondents [union officers] fall within the terms of the [Sherman] Anti-Trust Act.”157
By the 1920s several states had enacted statutes limiting courts’ labor injunctions. For
example, Arizona prohibited injunctions “involving or growing out of a dispute concerning the
terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property or
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to a property right of the party making the application.”158 This Arizona statute also prohibited
injunctions against persuading others, “by peaceful means,” to terminate their employment or to
refrain from patronizing a party, typically the employer, to the litigation.159 However, the Supreme
Court held this statute unconstitutional in the 1921 case of Truax v. Corrigan.160 In sum, a
conservative Supreme Court combined with many other federal judges willing to issue labor
injunctions, even when state courts and local officials sided with unionists, to maintain antitrust
law as a powerful tool against union organizing through the 1920s.
C. Anti-Union Contracts
Many people use the phrase “yellow-dog contract” to describe a contract in which an
employee promises not to join or help a labor union.161 This phrase is derogatory, rather than
neutral,162 so this Article uses the more neutral phrase “anti-union contract.”163
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The 1898 Erdman Act prohibited interstate railroads from using anti-union contracts,164
but the Supreme Court’s 1908 decision in Adair v. United States,165 “struck down the law as a
violation of freedom of contract.”166 Adair “rel[ied] heavily on”167 1905’s Lochner v. New York,168
in which the Supreme Court had similarly held unconstitutional a New York statute capping the
number of hours bakers could lawfully work. Before 1917, anti-union contracts were apparently
used only occasionally,169 perhaps because most employers did not much value winning a money
judgment against a former employee with little property or income.170 But the Supreme Court’s
1917 decision in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,171 fueled the growth of anti-union
contracts by enforcing them, not or not just with money judgments against individual employees,
but also with injunctions against those attempting to unionize to employees.172 As Matthew Finkin
writes, the Hitchman Company required its miners “to sign a contract that provided that the
employee would not join the union or make any effort to unionize. Because the miners held their
jobs on an at-will basis they could be discharged for joining or supporting a union or for seeking
collective address to their grievances.”173 The United Mine Workers nevertheless tried to organize
the workers, which prompted the employer’s case in equity—against certain members of the union

164

(Erdman) Act of June 1, 1898, ch. 370, § 10, 30 Stat. 424, 428 (1898); see John P. Roche, Entrepreneurial Liberty
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 LAB. HIST. 3, 11 (1963) (discussing congressional battle over Erdman Act and bill’s
final passage).
165

Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).

David E. Bernstein, Roots of the “Underclass”: The Decline of Laissez-Faire Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist
Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 102–09 (1993).
166

167

Id.

168

198 U.S.C. § 45.

169

Joel I. Seidman, The Yellow-Dog Contract, 46 Q. J. OF ECON. 348, 351 (1932).

As Witte put it, anti-union contracts “are for practical purposes [sic] unenforcible against the signers.” Witte, supra
note 163, at 22.
170

171

Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 232 (1917).

Seidman, supra note 169, at 351; Witte, supra note 163, at 22 (“This possibility dates from the Hitchman Coal &
Coke Co. decision, the case around which all discussions of the legal aspects of yellow dog contracts must center.”).
172

173

Matthew W. Finkin, The Meaning and Contemporary Vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 93 NEB. L. REV. 6, 11–
12 (2014).

49

as individuals and against one as an officer of the union174—seeking to enjoin the defendants from
“all attempts to organize the employees while employed under non-union contracts.”175
The Supreme Court upheld, with some modifications, the district court’s order enjoining
the defendants176 from trying to unionize the mine by “knowingly and willfully bringing about the
breaking by plaintiff’s employees of contracts of service.”177 The Court also enjoined the
defendants from “enticing plaintiff’s employees, present or future, to leave plaintiff’s service on
the ground that plaintiff does not recognize the United Mine Workers of America or runs a nonunion mine.”178 Finally, the Supreme Court enjoined the defendants from “interfering . . . with
plaintiff’s employees so as knowingly and willfully to bring about the breaking by plaintiff’s
employees, present and future, of their contracts of service.”179
Hitchman showed that anti-union contracts “could be used by employers to secure
injunctions prohibiting unions from attempting to organize their employees or inducing them to
join in strikes. With this development, yellow dog contracts became valuable to anti-union
employers.”180 After Hitchman, employers’ movement toward wider adoption of anti-union
Hitchman, 245 U.S. at 232 (“Those who were served and who answered the bill were T. L. Lewis, Vice President
of the U.M.W.A. and of the International Union U.M.W.A.; William Green, D. H. Sullivan, and “George” W. Savage,
(his correct Christian name is Gwilym), respectively President, Vice President, and Secretary-Treasurer of District
No. 6, U.M.W.A.; and A. R. Watkins, John Zelenka, and Lee Rankin, respectively President, Vice President and
Secretary-Treasurer of Sub-district No. 5 of District No. 6.” These are the individuals who were sued and subsequently
enjoined.).
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contracts accelerated.181 One example is the 1927 Fourth Circuit case, International Organization,
United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co.182 In Red Jacket, the
Fourth Circuit enjoined the United Mine Workers of America from “inciting, inducing, or
persuading the employees of the plaintiff to break their contract of employment with the
plaintiffs,”183 and from helping former employees stay in the homes that their employers provided
them in a company town.184 William Forbath says “In Hitchman’s wake, scores of yellow-dog
injunctions against the UMW blanketed West Virginia’s coal counties, and blocked all attempts to
organize the state’s miners.”185 “One could not work in a West Virginia mine or in the non-union
mines of southwestern Pennsylvania without signing such a contract.”186 More broadly in the
1920s, Forbath writes that “courts issued over 2100 anti-strike decrees and the proportion of strikes
met by injunctions to the total number of strikes reached an extraordinary 25%.”187 Witte’s 1930
article, Yellow Dog Contracts, referred to “their present widespread use.”188
D.

Classical Liberalism Impeded Unionization

Section II of this Article has, in its previous subsections, explained how unionization
attempts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were largely impeded by employers’ strengths
under three areas of law: (1) master-servant law’s evolution into the tort of malicious interference
with contract; (2) the application of the Sherman Act to labor cartels; and (3) the enforcement of
anti-union contracts. Other areas of law played a role as well. Perhaps most notably, constitutional
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law during this “Lochner Era”189 impeded unionization. As noted above of the 1921 Truax v.
Corrigan decision,190 “[f]ollowing Lochner, the Court invalidated . . . laws that prohibited
employers from forbidding their employees to join labor unions. These rulings likely inhibited the
growth of labor unions.”191 The Court had earlier somewhat stepped back from Lochner, so “[b]y
1917, Lochner seemed to be dead and buried.”192 However, Lochner “underwent a surprising
renaissance in the 1920s when the more aggressively Lochnerian wing of the [Supreme] Court,
bolstered by four appointments by President Warren Harding, took firm control. With a strong
Lochnerian majority in place, led by Chief Justice (and former president) William Howard Taft,
the Court . . . reviewed economic regulation much more aggressively than it had in the past.”193
For instance, in the above-discussed case arising out of Kansas,194 “Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v.
Court of Industrial Relations, the Court unanimously held that states could not require industrial
disputes to be settled by government-imposed mandatory arbitration.”195 In this era, as David
Bernstein writes, most Supreme Court justices:
in common with much of public opinion, saw labor unions as monopolistic
organizations that threatened the freedom of both individual workers and their
employers, just as monopolistic corporations threatened small businesses and
consumers. The Justices also argued that upholding liberty of contract was crucial
for the long-term prosperity of workers, because their ability to sell their labor in a
free marketplace was their primary asset. In Coppage v. Kansas, [decided in
1915,196] for example, the Court invalidated a law that prohibited employers from
firing workers who joined unions. Justice Pitney wrote for the Court:
The right [to liberty of contract] is as essential to the laborer as
to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of
persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save
by working for money.
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An interference with this liberty so serious as that now under
consideration, and so disturbing of equality of right, must be deemed
to be arbitrary, unless it be supportable as a reasonable exercise of
the police power of the State.
In the Court’s view, merely helping labor unions did not satisfy the police power
because, as noted above, unions were seen as potentially self-serving monopolistic
organizations.197
As this passage from Coppage exemplifies, much of the law discussed in the previous
pages broadly flowed from the widespread emphasis in the late 19th and, at least among many
judges, early 20th centuries on a classical liberal “freedom of contract” conception of the right to
sell one’s labor. Self-ownership of one’s body and labor had been core tenets of liberalism since
foundational liberals like John Locke and Adam Smith. Locke wrote that “everyman has a property
in his own Person. This no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work
of his hands, we may say, are properly his.”198 Adam Smith said “[t]he property which everyman
has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred
and inviolable.”199 This classical liberal emphasis on owning one’s labor and trading it for “other
property” was in the 19th century often called “free labor” and contrasted with slavery. This
classical liberal “free labor” philosophy contributed greatly to important Republican policies—
from the abolition of slavery to free-market (laissez-faire) economics—that shaped many late 19th
and early 20th century judges. As William Forbath, summarizing historian Eric Foner, writes: “the
abolitionist, talked about the freedom of the Northern worker in terms of self-ownership, that is,
simply not being a slave, being free to sell his own labor.”200 Forbath continues:
The middle class abolitionists’ characteristic attitude toward labor, Foner
writes, was exemplified in a pamphlet published by the New York abolitionist
William Jay. In the course of a discussion of the benefits of immediate
emancipation, Jay sought to answer the recurrent question, what would happen to
the slave when free:
He is free, and his own master, and can ask for no more. He
is, in fact, for a time, absolutely dependent on his late owner. He can
look to no other person for food to eat, clothes to put on, or house to
shelter him . . . He is required to work, but labor is no longer the
197
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badge of his servitude and the consummation of his misery, for it is
voluntary. For the first time in his life he is party to a contract . . . In
the course of time, the value of negro labor, like all other vendible
commodities, will be regulated by the supply and demand.
What is noteworthy in this argument, as Foner points out, is, first, the
abolitionist’s ready acceptance of the condition which prompted (and would
increasingly cause) so much complaint among the labor movement—the treatment
of human labor as a ‘vendible commodity;’ and, second, the rather dubious use of
the word ‘voluntary’ to describe the labor of an individual who owns nothing and
is ‘absolutely dependent’ on his employer. ‘To the labor movement, Jay’s
description of emancipation would qualify as a classic instance of ‘wage slavery:’
to Jay, it was an economic definition of freedom.’ And it was the abolitionists’
definition of freedom that would be enshrined by Gilded Age judges, some of them
youthful colleagues of Jay’s in the antislavery movement.201
In short, labor unions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries faced a tough audience in the many
judges long immersed in classical liberalism’s emphasis on self-ownership and contractual
freedom regarding the sale of labor.202
In contrast to these traditional judges, however, times were changing in the broader society.
The late 1800s and early 1900s were a time of turbulent growth and rising inequalities in the United
States.203
In 1890, 11 million of the nation’s 12 million families earned less than $1200 per
year; of this group, the average annual income was $380, well below the poverty
line. Rural Americans and new immigrants crowded into urban areas. Tenements
spread across city landscapes, teeming with crime and filth. Americans had sewing
machines, phonographs, skyscrapers, and even electric lights, yet most people
labored in the shadow of poverty.
...
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Violent strikes and riots wracked the nation.204
These violent strikes and riots embodied the turbulence of the era, as David Bernstein writes:
Coincident with industrialization, nationalization, urbanization, and immigration
were the 1880s rise of labor unions (craft and mass) and the 1890s consolidation of
industry into pools and trusts. The concentration of labor and capital intensified the
recurrent and sometimes violent labor conflict, for which names like Haymarket,
Homestead, and Pullman still serve as synecdoches.205
Violent conflicts between labor and capital intersected with conflicts among racial and ethnic
groups. For instance, many unions excluded Black workers from membership and when union
members went out on strike, employers often hired African-Americans as replacement workers,
whom the strikers derided as “scabs.”206 Black workers formed an “Anti-Strikers Railroad Union”
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to help break the 1894 Pullman strike,207 led by future Socialist Party presidential candidate
Eugene Debs,208 which “left forty people dead, and Chicago . . . resembling a war zone.”209
These turbulent decades coincided with broad ideological changes. The vast inequalities of
the Gilded Age provoked late 1800s populism,210 and then the Progressive Era of the early 1900s.
Progressives advanced the increasingly popular view that industrialization warranted a transition
from classical liberalism’s free markets (“laissez-faire”) toward more governmental effort to shift
power from big businesses and the rich to the broader population.211 This broad ideological and
legal transition from Gilded Age classical liberalism toward progressive regulation and
redistribution set the stage for the Great Depression and New Deal of the 1930s.212 The landmark
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labor legislation of that decade largely removed obstacles to unionization and in fact encouraged
the labor cartelization that empowered unions to reach agreements replacing employment at will
with arbitration of employee grievances. Those changes are discussed in the following section.
III.

A NEW DEAL FOR LABOR UNIONS: LESS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, MORE CARTELIZATION
A. The Great Depression

The Great Depression began in 1929. “Unemployment went from 3.2% in 1929 to 25.2%
in 1933 and stayed above 10% until 1941.”213
Bread lines, soup kitchens and rising numbers of homeless people became more
and more common in America’s towns and cities. Farmers couldn’t afford to
harvest their crops, and were forced to leave them rotting in the fields while people
elsewhere starved. In 1930, severe droughts in the Southern Plains brought high
winds and dust from Texas to Nebraska, killing people, livestock and crops. The
“Dust Bowl” inspired a mass migration of people from farmland to cities in search
of work.214
“Home foreclosures more than tripled from pre-Depression levels to 1932, and by 1933 one
thousand homes per day were subject to foreclosure. Home lending evaporated and . . . this was
partially due to a cascade of five thousand bank failures between 1929 and 1933, triggered by
panic-stricken depositors.”215

Gilded Age and Progressive Era reformers . . . crafted a new language of social and economic rights
. . . in response to provocations from the nation’s courts, whose interpretation of the Constitution
meant enjoining strikes and union organizing, imprisoning trade unionists, and nullifying labor and
social insurance legislation in the name of property rights and freedom of contract. . . .
Labor law reformers and trade unionists contested the laissez-faire conception of constitutional
freedom of contract and argued that real freedom of contract would be achieved through labor law
reform, which would overcome grave inequalities of bargaining power . . ., although this
achievement had to await the New Deal and World War II, which finally ushered the reformers’
narratives and political economy into the corridors of federal power.
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The Great Depression combined with the decline of classical liberalism to expand popular
and electoral support for shifting power from big businesses and the rich to the broader population,
especially in labor matters. Accordingly, one might think of conservative 1920s federal judges as
the last aging stones in the dam of classical liberalism holding back the massive waters of populist
redistribution, until the torrential rains of the Great Depression finally generated enough force to
break the dam. Or as Jeffrey Hirsch puts it, “[a]t times, social changes are so great that they are
unable to fit tolerably within the current legal regime. When that happens, a threshold is breached,
much like the widespread labor unrest and violence that, in combination with judicial hostility to
workers’ rights, ultimately spurred the creation of federal labor law.”216
B. Replacing Anti-Union Contracts with Legally-Encouraged Labor Cartelization
Major legal obstacles to unionization largely fell in the 1930s. For instance, anti-union
contracts were prohibited by the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act.217 It states that:
Any undertaking or promise, such as is described in this section, . . . is declared to
be contrary to the public policy of the United States, shall not be enforceable in any
court of the United States and shall not afford any basis for the granting of legal or
equitable relief by any such court, including specifically the following:
Every undertaking or promise . . . constituting or contained in any contract or
agreement of hiring or employment . . . whereby
(a) Either party to such contract or agreement undertakes or promises not to join,
become, or remain a member of any labor organization or of any employer
organization; or
(b) Either party to such contract or agreement undertakes or promises that he will
withdraw from an employment relation in the event that he joins, becomes, or
remains a member of any labor organization or of any employer organization.218
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The Norris-LaGuardia Act was “constructed to greatly curtail the use of injunctions against union
organizing and collective bargaining,”219 and says “[n]o court of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute.”220 Showing the extent to which the 1929 start of the Great Depression
combined with the longer-term transition toward progressivism to shift many people’s views, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was sponsored by Republicans and passed a Congress that would not until
the following year switch to both houses controlled by Democrats.
Democrats won the 1932 election in a landslide “with a mandate to combat the Great
Depression.”221 The Democratic candidate for president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, defeated
incumbent Republican Herbert Hoover by an electoral college margin of 472 to 59. From 1933
through 1946, Democrats controlled the presidency and both houses of Congress.
As discussed above, the Clayton Act of 1914 had moved toward exempting labor cartels
(unions) from the federal antitrust laws, but was narrowly interpreted by the Supreme Court, so
“boycotts and, in many circumstances, strikes and picketing, remained subject to antitrust
liability.”222 In contrast, New Deal legislation not only exempted labor cartels from the antitrust
laws, but actively encouraged the formation of labor cartels. This was originally attempted by the
1933 National Industry Recovery Act, struck down by the Supreme Court,223 but was then
accomplished by the Wagner Act of 1935.224 The “Wagner Act was ineffective until 1937, its
functionality hamstrung by employers’ near universal contempt for its mandates and the courts’
similarly widespread view that it could not possibly survive constitutional review either.”225
However, the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., a
landmark decision, “which at once upheld the Wagner Act and legitimated the New Deal itself.”226
The Jones & Laughlin Steel decision occurred shortly after the “switch in time that saved nine,”
when two conservative justices switched their votes and “abandoned original understanding of the
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Constitution to permit what would otherwise have been unconstitutional--the New Deal.”227 The
“Lochner Era” in constitutional law was definitely over by 1937.228
Section 1 of the Wagner Act, also known as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),229
begins “[t]he denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by
some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of
industrial strife.”230 Section 1 then refers to “[t]he inequality of bargaining power between
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and
employers,” before declaring:
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National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act.”
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The Court’s switch in time averted a constitutional showdown between the Court
and the political system, and between 1937 and 1943 Roosevelt remade the Court
with nine nominees. The immediate agenda of the New Deal Court was to
interpret the Commerce Clause broadly enough to embrace regulatory legislation
with incidental (but demonstrable) effects on interstate commerce, and with this
the coalition consolidated the new Commerce Clause jurisprudence with
unanimous majorities by 1942.
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the West Coast Hotel case was decided, the Supreme Court put the final nail in the Lochner coffin with the Carolene
Products case”); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental
Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 50–51 (2003) (“the 1920s and the Taft Court represented the last gasp of
classical liberal principles in American public life for decades to come”).
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See supra note 8.
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29 U.S.C. § 151.
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Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury . . . by encouraging
practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes . . . and by
restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.231
Accordingly, Section 1 of the NLRA declared “the policy of the United States to” be “encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.”232 The NLRA created the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce employee rights.233
The “centerpiece”234 of the NLRA is Section 7, which says “Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”235 Section 8 says “[i]t shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer” to, among other things, “interfere with” employees’ section 7 rights
or “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of employees.”236 The NLRA was a
“great assault on the concept of at-will employment, since a worker could no longer be fired for
reasons protected by Section 7 of the Act.”237
In short, the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts largely overrode the legal impediments to
unionization discussed in Section II. The Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited anti-union contracts
and greatly reduced the labor injunctions that had been based in tort or antitrust law. The Wagner
Act (NLRA) encouraged the formation of labor unions and pressured employers to buy labor from
workers represented by the union, through a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), rather than
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Id.

232

Id.

233

49 Stat. 449, § 3 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 153) (expressing intent and establishing the NLRB). National Labor
Relations Board, 1935 passage of the Wagner Act, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/1935passage-of-the-wagner-act (last visited Dec. 1, 2020) (“The Wagner Bill proposed to create a new independent
agency—the National Labor Relations Board, made up of three members appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate-to enforce employee rights.”).
234

SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW BODIE, LABOR LAW 35 (2d ed. 2020).
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29 U.S.C § 158.

Id. The NLRA established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce these provisions and “to hold
elections pursuant to [NLRA section] 9 to determine whether the majority of workers in an appropriate unit wished to
be represented by a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining.” ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 234,
at 36.
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Michael D. Yates, Should We Return to the Policy of the Wagner Act?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 559, 561 (2002).
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from other workers, some of whom might be willing to work for a lower wage.238 In other words,
the NLRA facilitates workers organizing into a collective (cartel) to bargain as one unit against the
employer, rather than leaving individual workers to compete with each other for jobs. The NLRA,
as Richard Posner writes, “is a kind of reverse Sherman Act, designed to encourage cartelization
of labor markets.”239
Michael Wachter similarly explains that “the economic model of the NLRA was
cartelization of the labor market.”240 “Unions would have monopoly power in the labor market,”
so “wages would be set by the dictates of the collective bargaining process and not the dictates of
the marketplace.”241 The NLRA aimed to raise wages and reduce “industrial strife” by permitting
sellers of labor (workers) to form a cartel and by pressuring buyers of such labor (employers) to
buy labor from workers represented by the cartel, rather than from other sellers (workers) who
might accept a price (wage) lower than the cartel’s price.
The original NLRA (Wagner Act) was modified in 1947 by the Taft Hartley Act to prohibit
the “closed shop,” so employers are no longer literally required to buy labor only from union
members.242 But prohibiting the closed shop did not typically free employers from negotiating
with a cartel or leave individual workers competing with each other. That is because once a union
wins an election to be the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative, the union represents all
relevant workers (including both union members and non-members) in collective bargaining, so
all relevant workers are governed by the same CBA, and thus all of them are paid the same union
wage.
Employers are generally prohibited from paying lower wages or providing lesser benefits
to non-union-members doing similar work (and with the same seniority) as union-member
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The employer pays wages and benefits to employees, but at a price set by the CBA between the employer and
union.
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POSNER, supra note 115, § 12.2.
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Wachter, supra note 216, at 442 (“the economic model of the NLRA was to cartelize the labor market”).
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Id. at 428.

ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 234, at 38 (“Taft-Hartley outlawed the ‘closed shop’ (where union membership
is a prerequisite for employment), and permitted states to enact so-called ‘right to work’ laws outlawing even the
‘union shop’ (where union membership or its financial equivalent is required only after an initial period of
employment)”); Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 174-81 (2015)
(describing the NLRA allowing membership of a union as a pre-requisite to employment, but that allowance being
removed by the Taft-Hartley Act); Denise Oas & Steven Lance Popejoy, The Right-to-Work Battle Rages on at Both
the Federal and State Levels, 29 MIDWEST L.J. 71, 75-76 (2019) (“Historically, the closed shop (defined as a union
security agreement which required union membership as a condition of employment) had been used by the NLRA
during World War II . . . Following the war, the government exercised greater control over labor unions, and with the
passage of Taft-Hartley, outlawed closed shops.”).
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employees because both types of employees are likely to be in the same “bargaining unit,” 243 for
which the union has won an NLRB-supervised election to be the “exclusive bargaining
representative” for employees in that unit.244 Exclusive representation by a union requires the
employer and union to negotiate only one CBA, which must apply to and treat all employees within

29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment”); Richard R. Carlson, The Origin and Future of Exclusive Representation in
American Labor Law, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 779, 837 (1992) (an exclusive representative’s “role is that of a bargaining
agent, and its power derives primarily from the employer’s duty to bargain with the union and “to treat with no other.”);
29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1935) (“The [N.L.R.B.] shall decide in each case whether , . . the unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof”). See also N.L.R.B.
v. Action Auto., Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985) (“The Board’s discretion in this area is broad, reflecting Congress’
recognition of the need for flexibility in shaping the [bargaining] unit to the particular case. The Board does not
exercise this authority aimlessly; in defining bargaining units, its focus is on whether the employees share a community
of interest.”)(internal quotations omitted); Kindred Nursing Centers E., LLC v. N.L.R.B., 727 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir.
2013) (“The [community of interest] test includes the following five factors: (1) similarity in skills, interests, duties
and working conditions; (2) functional integration of the plant, including interchange and contact among the
employees; (3) the employer’s organization and supervisory structure; (4) the bargaining history; and (5) the extent of
union organization among the employees.”).
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ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 234, at 47 (the NLRA is “based on the principle of exclusive representation (only
the representatives chosen by a majority of the employees in a unit may bargain with the employer over terms and
conditions of employment, to the exclusion of individual employees or a members-only group); and a legally mandated
duty to bargain (both the exclusive representative and the employer are legally obligated to bargain in ‘good faith’”);
POSNER, supra note 115, § 12.2.
244

If an organizing campaign succeeds to the extent that at least 30 percent of the workers sign cards
authorizing the union to be their collective bargaining representative, the National Labor Relations
Board will conduct an election for collective bargaining representative. If the union wins a majority
of the votes cast, it will become the workers’ exclusive bargaining representative. The employer
will then be required to bargain with the union in good faith over the terms of an employment
contract for all the workers in the collective bargaining unit; he will not be allowed to bargain
separately with individual workers.
The representation election, the principle of exclusive representation, and the union shop together
constitute an ingenious set of devices . . . for overcoming the free-rider problems that would
otherwise plague the union as a large-numbers cartel. . . .
The design of the electoral unit in representation election—the bargaining unit as it is called—is
critical. The Labor Board will certify any group of employees that is at once homogeneous with
regard to conditions of employment (wages, fringe benefits, work duties, etc.) and distinct from
other employees of the firm. A single plant or facility may contain several different bargaining units
each of which will negotiate separately with the employer. Consistent with the law’s policy of
facilitating worker cartels, the Board generally certifies the smallest rather than the largest possible
unit. Transaction costs among workers are lower the fewer the workers and the more harmonious
their interests.
Id.
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the bargaining unit similarly, regardless of an employee’s union membership status.245 Only in
exceptional cases or non-exclusive (“members only”) representative agreements,246 may
employers negotiate individualized deals with some, but not all, employees in a bargaining unit.
Otherwise, an employer paying a non-union worker less than the union wage in the CBA would
commit an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA.247 So employers generally must pay
union-represented employees the (higher) cartel price of labor whether or not a particular employee
is technically a member of the union. In other words, the NLRA’s legally-encouraged cartelization
of labor raising wages above their competitive level persists by effectively including in the cartel
all workers—union member or not—the employer may hire for the relevant jobs.
After the NLRA, labor “unions are legalized cartels attempting to monopolize labor
markets in much the same manner that business firms attempt to monopolize a product market.”248
Much as a sole monopolist business can profit by raising its price above that which sellers in a

See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2467 (2018) (“Not only is
the union given the exclusive right to speak for all the employees in collective bargaining, but the employer is required
. . . to listen to and to bargain in good faith with only that union.).
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246

ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 234, at 132.
In most settings, before any union enters the scene, employees have preexisting relationships with
their employers which are governed by employer rules subject to the state common law of contracts.
In J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, the employer entered into written employment agreements with its
employees and invoked those agreements as a bar to any collective bargaining with the exclusive
representative selected by the employees. The Supreme Court held that the individual agreements
provided no bar to the employer’s duty to bargain with the employees’ exclusive representative.
“The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of
separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and
serve the welfare of the group.” Because unions can negotiate or allow different arrangements, as in
the sports and entertainment industries, J.I. Case is best seen as establishing a presumption that can
only be overcome by clear evidence of the union’s waiver of its right to insist on exclusive dealing.
One reason for the rule is that individual contracts could dissipate the strength of the collective
agent. As the Court noted, “advantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of industrial peace as
disadvantages.”

Compare Merck, Sharp & Dohme Corp., 367 NLRB No. 122 (May 7, 2019) (holding that vacation benefits given only
to non-union workers was lawful under the NLRA because of the structure of the “members-only” union relationship).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees”). See also Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions A Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 169, 178 (2015) (under the NLRA “once a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit chooses
to be represented by a union, the union becomes the exclusive representative of the whole bargaining unit, and the
employer has a duty to bargain with the union over all employees’ wages and working conditions.”).
247

HENRY N. BUTLER, ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 470 (3d ed. 2014); id. at 471 (“Unions increase
wages above market wages by either (a) restricting entry of non-union workers into union controlled jobs and allowing
the market to clear at a higher price or (b) negotiating higher wages with employers.”) Each tends to have the same
effects of reducing the supply of labor and raising its price. Id. at Figure VIII-11.
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competitive market would charge,249 a cartel’s members can similarly profit by uniformly raising
their prices above that which sellers in a competitive market would charge. But higher prices tend
to reduce the quantity of whatever goods or labor is sold because some buyers who would have
been willing to pay the competitive market price are unwilling to pay the higher monopoly price.250
So a cartel’s success typically depends on its members’ unity in limiting their total output (quantity
sold) as well as maintaining price. Cartels often fail because some cartel members, or rival sellers
from outside the cartel, attract buyers by selling at a price below the cartel price,251 which tends to
require the remaining “loyal” members of the cartel to lower their prices too, if they are to continue
finding willing buyers.
Consequently, the “collective” part of “collective bargaining” is central to the cartelization
of labor through which unions raise wages or benefits for their members. As the AFL-CIO puts it,
“Collective bargaining is . . . the best means for raising wages”; “through collective bargaining,
working people in unions have higher wages, better benefits and safer workplaces.”252 Or, in the
words of a textbook on the economic analysis of law, “[t]he main purpose of a union . . . is to limit
the supply of labor so that the employer cannot use competition among workers to control the price
of labor (wages).”253 Suppressing competition from other workers (sellers of labor) is key to a
union’s success because only if all sellers of (the relevant type of) labor collectively refuse to work
for less than the “union wage,” must the employer must pay that wage to obtain that labor. But if
this refusal—a strike—does not include all available sellers of such labor, then employers can hire
workers outside the collective as replacements for the strikers, or employers can avoid paying the
higher union wage by shifting production to lower wage, non-union shops.254
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See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.

BUTLER, ET AL., supra note 248, at 471 (“Unions increase wages above market wages by either (a) restricting entry
of non-union workers into union controlled jobs and allowing the market to clear at a higher price or (b) negotiating
higher wages with employers.”) Each tends to have the same effects of reducing the supply of labor and raising its
price. Id. Figure VIII-11.
250

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 115, at 364 (“The members or a cartel agree to keep prices up, which profits the
members as a group. Each individual member, however, profits even more by undercutting the cartel’s price and luring
buyers away from other members. To prevent such ‘cheating,’ the cartel must punish members who undercut the
cartel’s price.”).
251

Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. Of Indus. Orgs., What Unions Do: Collective Bargaining, https://aflcio.org/whatunions-do/empower-workers/collective-bargaining (last visited August 4, 2020).
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BUTLER, ET AL., supra note 248, at 427.
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Keith J. Gross, Separate to Unite: Will Change to Win Strengthen Organized Labor in America?, 24 BUFF. PUB.
INT. L.J. 75, 79–81 (2006).
For example, in 1919 the AFL-affiliate Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers
of America (“AA”) organized a steel strike of over 350,000 workers in hopes of convincing U.S.
Steel to recognize the union and agree to collective bargaining. U.S. Steel refused to discuss the
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For instance, a critic of the Supreme Court’s 1917 Hitchman case enforcing anti-union
contracts, Harvard Law Professor Francis Bowes Sayre, discussed the coal industry at the time:
Practically all coal mines in what was known as the Panhandle District of West
Virginia were run upon this non-union basis, while the entire industry in Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois, known as the “Central Competitive Field,” were operated
under union conditions, all the employees being members of the United Mine
Workers of America. The coal of each district came into direct competition with
that of the other; and as long as coal could be produced in the unorganized
Panhandle District at rockbottom wages and consequent low production costs, it
not only became increasingly more difficult for the operators in the Central
Competitive Field to maintain prices high enough to grant certain concessions
demanded by the union, but it also enabled mine owners to break strikes called in
the Central Competitive Field by supplying coal mined in the nonunion Panhandle
District. In other words, if collective bargaining was to continue to function freely
in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, it would be necessary to remove the competition of
the unorganized Panhandle mines. The fact that the industry functioned upon a
national scale required the unions similarly to operate upon a nation-wide scale.
Accordingly, at the international convention of the United Mine Workers of
America, held at Indianapolis in 1907, it was decided as a measure “absolutely
necessary to protect us against the competition that comes from the unorganized
fields east of us” to unionize the mines of the Panhandle District.255

AA’s demands, and simply responded by bringing in strikebreakers--both white and black--and
suppressing the strikers with private guards and police. . . . At the same time, . . . unions . . . like the
International Ladies Garment Workers’ Union (“ILGWU”), were “torn asunder by competition from
non-union shops” . . . .
As the 1919-20 steel strike demonstrates, employers in industries with semi-skilled or unskilled
workers often can easily replace strikers, which is why unskilled workers have diminished
bargaining power.
Id.
Sayre, supra note 94, at 674. See also Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1917) (“The
unorganized condition of the mines in the Panhandle and some other districts was recognized as a serious interference
with the purposes of the union in the Central Competitive Field, particularly as it tended to keep the cost of production
low, and, through competition with coal produced in the organized field, rendered it more difficult for the operators
there to maintain prices high enough to induce them to grant certain concessions demanded by the union.”).
255
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This passage, by an advocate of unionization,256 is just one example of the standard economics
that success by cartels in raising the price their members can charge requires suppressing
competition from other sellers.257
For these reasons, Michael Wachter explains, the Wagner Act, “could only take wages out
of competition if the entire industry, including all new entrants, were unionized and wages were
bargained at the industry level. . . . But from the outset, staying non-union under the Wagner Act
gave firms much lower labor costs, which provided a great inducement to stay non-union.”258
Wachter adds that “higher union wages” could only under the NLRA “be paid for out of corporate
profits since the employers could be forestalled from increasing prices by product market
competition from non-union producers or those with weaker unions.”259 In other words, investors

256

Sayre, supra note 94, at 694–695.
Were it not for trade unions, wages through the drive of relentless competition must be driven
inevitably below the minimum cost of subsistence, and working conditions be forced to a point
beyond average human endurance; the inescapable harvest could only be poorhouse relief, charitable
doles, reduced vitality, increased sickness, an increased death rate, overcrowding, crime, and the
long train of social ills which dance attendance upon a society which pays the worker less than it
costs him and his family to live.
Furthermore, in its present form industry can not be stabilized except through organization methods,
such as trade agreements, arbitration boards and similar devices, made possible through trade
unionism. There is a very real social interest, then, in the existence of trade unions; and these can
not continue to exist and function unless they are free to add to their membership by persuading
through lawful means non-union men to join their ranks and by “organizing” non-union fields.
When, therefore, in the Hitchman case, one comes to reckon up the interests concerned, one finds
weighing against the plaintiff a social interest of prime importance in the free existence and
legitimate functioning of trade unions.

Id. at 674.
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 115, § 10.1 (9th ed. 2014) (“any part of the market that is outside of the colluding
circle limits the power of the colluding sellers to raise the market price.”) See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note
115, at 364 (“The members or a cartel agree to keep prices up, which profits the members as a group. Each individual
member, however, profits even more by undercutting the cartel’s price and luring buyers away from other members.
To prevent such ‘cheating,’ the cartel must punish members who undercut the cartel’s price.”).
257
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Wachter, supra note 216, at 441. See also Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance:
Misunderstanding the National Labor Relations Act., 71 TEX. L. REV. 921, 924 (1993) (“Unions typically seek to
increase labor’s share of a firm’s revenues; the firm that is successfully unionized, and as a result pays
higher wages and benefits, must continue to compete against non-union firms that generally pay lower wages. It may
therefore be reasonable for firms to regard union activism itself, by its very nature, as economically threatening to the
firm. Yet union activity is protected by federal law against employer discrimination and interference.”).
259

Wachter, supra note 216, at 441. In contrast, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, which was
held unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), authorized the creation
of industry cartels to reduce competition. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a
Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 599-600 (2007).
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seeking high rates of return (generated by corporate profits) could be expected to move capital,
and thus job opportunities, from unionized firms with high labor costs to non-unionized firms with
lower labor costs, including firms operating outside the U.S.260 This opposition of interests
between workers and owners, Wachter points out, made “[t]he cooperative spirit envisioned by
Senator Wagner”—in which employers “[c]ompelled to live with unions . . . would learn to
cooperate with them”—“an impossible dream from the beginning.”261
C. Legally-Encouraged Labor Cartelization Replaced At-Will Employment with
Labor Grievance Arbitration
The previous sections of this Article explained that employers understandably resist
unionization because it raises labor costs, and that such resistance in the U.S. was generally
successful in the 19th and early 20th centuries in staving off unionization, and thus the collective
bargaining agreements that have since replaced at-will employment with arbitration of labor
grievances. “Nineteenth century employers,” Nolan and Abrams emphasize, “recognized unions
only under great pressure, and accepted arbitration even less willingly. No more than a handful of
arbitration cases on wages and hours could have occurred before 1900.”262 Witte concurs that the
“great weakness of” late 19th century labor arbitration laws “was that the employers generally
refused arbitration.”263 Similarly in the first three decades of the 20th century, most employers—
often with courts’ help—continued successfully to resist unionization, even amidst ongoing
violence and Progressive Era legislation. So, even through the 1920s most employers refused to
submit workplace disputes to arbitration. Pre-1930s employers could refuse to arbitrate workplace
disputes because employers usually had the legal power (under the laws discussed in Section II)
to resolve disputes through other means, including simply firing employees asserting grievances.

Andrias, supra note 4, at 26–27 (an “employer may avoid unionization by closing its operations, by subcontracting,
by ‘doublebreasting’ through a nonunion company, or by moving production.”) Due to these factors and others, like
competition from workers overseas, unions have declined in the private sector since the 1950s and now only represent
about 7% of private-sector workers. “Following the upsurge in organizing during New Deal, union density--the
percentage of workers in unions--rose to a peak of 35% in the mid-1950s. Density remained largely stable through the
postwar period, until the 1970s and 1980s saw the labor movement’s precipitous decline.” Charles Du, Securing Public
Interest Law’s Commitment to Left Politics, 128 Yale L.J. Forum 244, 249–50 (2018). “[B]y 2017, just 10.7% of all
workers in the United States belonged to a union, including only 6.5% of private-sector workers.” Id.
260

261

Wachter, supra note 216, at 440–41.

262

Nolan & Abrams, supra note 32, at 380.

WITTE, supra note 28, at 10. “Some demand was expressed in labor circles for legislation to compel employers to
arbitrate. . . . But Samuel Gompers came out strongly against compulsory arbitration . . . [and] [h]is position was
officially adopted by the American Federation of Labor . . . , [which] declared itself in favor of agreements with
employers on conditions of employment and also of voluntary arbitration, but totally in opposition to compulsory
arbitration— a position from which it has not deviated since.” Id.
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So long as employers could fire and replace employees asserting grievances, employers had little
incentive to submit employee grievances to binding arbitration.264
By contrast, the early 20th century ideological shift from classical liberalism to
progressivism combined with the Great Depression to produce massive legal changes in the 1930s.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited anti-union contracts and greatly reduced the labor
injunctions that had been based in tort or antitrust law. The Wagner Act (NLRA) went further in
encouraging the formation of labor cartels (unions) and then pressuring employers to buy labor
from workers represented by the cartel, thus encouraging unions to do what cartels do—raise
prices—in this case the prices of labor. Unions raise wages or benefits for their members through
collective (cartel) bargaining rather than leaving individual workers to compete against each other
for jobs, wages, and benefits.
The agreements arising out of collective bargaining typically implement the major change
of replacing employers’ freedom to fire workers at will with the constraint that employers can fire
a worker only “for cause.”265 Why did employers—after decades of successfully resisting this huge
limitation on their freedom—accept it in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)? Mostly
because the NLRA and other progressive legislation had greatly restricted employers’ freedom to
buy labor from workers not represented by the government-encouraged cartel (union) that had won
an NLRB-supervised election to be the “exclusive bargaining representative” for workers doing
the relevant jobs.266 As the Supreme Court said in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., “[w]hen most parties enter into [a] contractual relationship they do so
voluntarily, in the sense that there is no real compulsion to deal with one another, as opposed to
dealing with other parties. This is not true of the labor agreement.”267 Employers are legallycompelled to contract with the union rather than other workers offering similar types of labor, and

WITTE, supra note 28, at 45–46. “Nearly always,” Witte observes, “recognition of and dealing with the union
precedes arbitration.” “Arbitration concerning the interpretation and application of contract provisions—by far the
most frequent type of arbitration in recent decades— can occur only when there is an agreement to interpret.”
264

POSNER, supra note 115, § 12.5 (9th ed. 2014) (“employment at will is the normal form of labor contract in the
United States. The worker can quit when he wants; the employer can fire the employee when the employer wants.”);
id. § 12.4 (“Collective bargaining contracts generally establish a grievance machinery for arbitrating workers’
complaints and also give workers job security—not absolute security, for they can be laid off if the firm’s demand for
labor declines, but security against being fired other than for good cause (determined by means of the grievance
machinery).”) See also MARK ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1:29 (5th ed. 2014) (“Eventually, most
collective bargaining agreements contained protection from discharge except for ‘just cause,’ with arbitration to
resolve grievances.”); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 931–33 (Kenneth May ed., 8th ed.
2016)(union contracts almost always require cause for dismissal, and typically provide an arbitration mechanism as a
method of review of employer decisions.); Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic
Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679 (1994) (surveying history of employment-atwill rule and its exceptions).
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See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
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363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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it is this compulsion that gives unions the power to extract from employers agreements to replace
at-will employment with arbitration of employee grievances.
Once an employer accepts that it must buy its labor from workers exclusively represented
by the union, the employer is typically willing to pay a high price for the union’s promise not to
strike.268 So in exchange for that no-strike promise, unions are typically able to extract employers’
promises not to fire workers except “for cause” and to submit to an arbitrator’s decision on what
counts as “cause” in a particular case.269 Unions are also often able to extract other CBA
restrictions on employers’ freedom to discipline or re-assign duties of employees, and to submit
grievances about those matters to arbitration, as well.270 This “grievance procedure” culminating
in arbitration, “rather than a strike, is the terminal point of a disagreement,” between workers and
their employer under the NLRA, Warrior & Gulf explained.271 In other words, legally-encouraged
labor cartelization was the primary driver replacing strikes with labor arbitration.

ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 234, at 157 (“The ability to withdraw the company’s labor force en masse is a
union’s principal weapon. The NLRA itself provides specific protection for the strike.”); id. (“Under the NLRA, a
union is legally entitled to go on strike with relatively little hindrance”). POSNER, supra note 115, § 12.2 (9th ed.
2014).
268

[The NLRA] makes it hard for the employer to operate with replacement workers by forbidding him
to pay them a higher wage than the striking workers whom they replace, by allowing the strikers to
picket the plant, and by forbidding him to sever the employment relationship with the striking
workers. He must therefore reinstate the strikers when the strike is over unless their jobs have been
filled by permanent replacements, but in that event he must place the strikers at the head of the queue
to fill vacancies as they occur. These three rules work together by allowing the strikers to identify
the replacement workers, by reminding the latter that when the strike ends they may find themselves
working side by side with the strikers—an uncomfortable, sometimes a dangerous, proximity that
deters many people from hiring on as replacements—and by preventing the employer from paying
a premium wage to compensate the replacements for this additional cost of work.
Id.
WITTE, supra note 28, at 49. (1953) (“Grievance arbitration was extensively adopted as a corollary of the
development of grievance procedures and of no-strike provisions in union contracts.”) CBAs commonly permit
employers to fire, or otherwise discipline, an employee only “for cause.” ROTHSTEIN, ET AL, supra note 265, § 9:1
(“Eventually, most collective bargaining agreements contained protection from discharge except for ‘just cause,’ with
arbitration to resolve grievances.”); FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 15–4–15–
6 (7th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2014) (union contracts almost always require cause for dismissal, and typically provide an
arbitration mechanism as a method of review of employer decisions.).
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WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 8, at 222 (unions may “arbitrate cases involving any alleged breach of a CBA
provision. These cases might involve any number of issues such as an allegation that an employer has sub-contracted
work in violation of a work-preservation provision, a dispute over whether a certain scheduling system is permissible,
a request to accommodate a disabled employee, or allegations that pay or break provisions are not being properly
followed.”).
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Through this process of legally-compelling employers to buy labor from a cartel, unions
and labor grievance arbitration grew from the 1930s to the 1950s.272 As the previous paragraph
suggested, a promise not to strike is typically a union’s main bargaining chip in negotiating a CBA
because the right to strike—“to withdraw the company’s labor force en masse”—“is a union’s
principal weapon.”273 So in the late 1930s the newly-created National Labor Relations Board
worked to maximize the strength of that weapon (the strike) and thus the value of that bargaining
chip (a promise not to strike). “Under the leadership of a group of leftist lawyers between 1935
and 1939, the NLRB aggressively defended the right to strike. With an obvious sense that an
effective right to strike was crucial to the entire regime of labor law, the agency’s staff went to
considerable lengths to protect strikers from reprisals by employers and government officials.”274
The year 1936, when the constitutionality of the NLRA and NLRB were still in doubt,275
was a particularly intense year of industrial warfare, often in the form of the sit-down strike, in
which workers occupied their employers’ buildings to stop production until employers recognized
the union.276 Sit-down striker-trespassers sometimes successfully fought off attempts by police
and private security forces to remove the trespassers and permit production to resume with
replacement workers. Ahmed White describes the landmark sit-down strike of General Motors
plants in Flint, Michigan, that began on December 30, 1936.
[C]onsistent with the union’s overall plans but in a spontaneous way,
workers seized Fisher Body Plants Nos. 1 and 2. The seizure was orderly. Strikers
immediately ushered out foremen and managers and set about securing the
sprawling facilities against attack and otherwise preparing for an occupation that
would last an extraordinary forty-four days. During this time, the strikers
successfully repelled a major assault by the police--an ignominious rout that
unionists tauntingly dubbed the “Battle of the Running Bulls.” The strikers also
defied two court injunctions ordering them to evacuate the plants, in part by
bringing to light the issuing judges’ ownership of GM stock. . . . [S]hortages created
by the strike bottlenecked production and crippled GM’s operations nationwide.
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Ahmed A. White, Industrial Terrorism and the Unmaking of New Deal Labor Law, 11 NEV. L.J. 561, 582 (2011)
(“In 1936 alone, however, there were forty-eight sit-down strikes of at least one day’s duration. Between 1936 and
1939, there would be almost six hundred major sit-down strikes, most conducted by CIO unionists. In most cases,
these strikes were used by workers to press organizational aims in the face of employers’ use of illegal means to resist
union recognition and, of course, maintain production.”).

71

Indeed, the strike spread to around a dozen other GM facilities, eventually idling
about 150,000 production workers.
As the strike wore on, GM gradually ran out of options. After the defeat of
the local police, the company was unable either to cajole or threaten Michigan’s
liberal governor, Frank Murphy, into using the National Guard to oust the strikers;
it was also unable to convince President Roosevelt to back down the CIO
leadership. In the meantime, the strike succeeded in negating GM’s erstwhile
capacity for labor repression: its hundreds of police and spies were rendered
useless, and its capacity for propaganda was, for the time at least, trumped by the
workers’ sensational gambit. . . . [T]he company was forced into a preliminary
agreement that provided for the company’s eventual recognition of the UAW as the
exclusive agent of the company’s production workers.
The political significance of the strike extended beyond GM. Needless to
say, the strike had been thrilling, front-page news nationwide. Aside from the
remarkable spectacle of impoverished workers defiantly holding the property of the
world’s largest company, the UAW victory was by far the single most significant
victory over an open shop employer in American history. Few would have expected
the UAW ever to prevail, given GM’s vast resources and the strength of its
opposition to unionism. Workers of all kinds drew inspiration from the strikers’
victory. Autoworkers, in particular, responded with a new confidence in industrial
unions and in the sit-down strike as a means of achieving this. In the weeks
immediately following the end of the Flint strike, the UAW pulled at least eighteen
sit-down strikes at other GM facilities before the company and the union finally
agreed to a company-wide contract in mid-March 1937.277
This story exemplifies the labor movement’s subordination of the “law in the books” (what statutes
and courts said) to the “law in action”278 imposed by striker-trespassers numerous enough to hold

277

Id. at 583–84.

278

On the distinction between the books and the action, see Roscoe Pound, The Law in the Books and the Law in
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
In formalistic thinking, there is an assumption that the statement and application of a norm will
produce changes in reality, and that “law in the books” corresponds to “law in action.” . . . The
counterclaim is that law in action is different from law in the books and that legal writing has, at
best, only an indirect connection to social change. The origin of this critique goes back to the
sociological jurisprudence movement developed by Roscoe Pound, which criticized legal studies
for their emphasis on legal rules and decision-making, while ignoring the social context and
implications of those decisions.
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an employer’s property against law-enforcement efforts to evict them,279 and popular enough to
deter progressive Democrats in the White House and governor’s office from enforcing the law in
the books against those striker-trespassers.280

White, supra note 82, at 1118-19 (2018) (“Dean Dinwoodey, law professor and editor of U.S. Law Week, spoke
for most legal scholars when he declared in the New York Times that ‘under well settled principles of property law,
the employer has a legally protected right to the exclusive possession of his factory or plant, just as the householder
has to the exclusive possession of his home.’ In this sense, Dinwoodey said, the strikers were really nothing but
trespassers.”). The NLRA permits some conduct that would otherwise be trespass. See Deborah Jacobson, Union
Trespass: Sears v. Carpenters and Labor Law Preemption, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 779, 783 (1979) (“The protections of
[NLRA] section 7 are thus quite broad: they extend to organizational activities, to activities in support of other
employees, and to the preservation of area standards. Moreover, these protections apply to some extent even when the
activity constitutes a trespass: in such cases, a proper accommodation between the respective rights is to be made by
the NLRB.”); James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV.
518, 543 (2004) (discussing balancing the state common law property trespass rights and federal statutory rights).
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White, supra note 82, at 1097–98 (2018) (“The GM strike succeeded in part because neither the Roosevelt
Administration nor state forces under the control of Michigan Governor Frank Murphy intervened forcefully to oust
the strikers.”) See also Vivian M. Baulch and Patricia Zacharias, The historic 1936-37 Flint auto plant strikes, THE
DETROIT NEWS, June 23, 1997.
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As the nation was emerging from the Great Depression, the striking workers enjoyed the sympathy
of most of the people, including Michigan governor Frank Murphy and popular New Deal President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Roosevelt had promised in his inaugural speech to drive out the
“economic royalists,” a pointed reference to the General Motors officials.”
...
The union called for supporters to gather at Cadillac Square in Detroit as a show of strength. The
overflowing crowd of 150,000 supporters surprised even the union sympathizers and gave the union
the self-confidence they needed to show its power and solidarity over its management “oppressors.”
Other union workers joined in sympathy strikes, closing plants in other states.
Among the plants closed by a sit-down strike was Fisher No. 2, also in Flint. The company
responded by turning off the heat, and the cold winter caused the strikers there to compare
themselves to George Washington and his men at Valley Forge.
Then, on Jan. 11, 1937, the police tried to stop food delivery [to the strikers by their families]. A
riot ensued.
“The rioting at Flint resulted in injury to 16 strikers and spectators and 11 officers,” The Detroit
News reported. . . . . “Most of the strikers were injured by buckshot fired from riot guns by the Flint
police. The officers were injured principally by missiles thrown from the plant by the stay-in
strikers.”
“A pitched battle raged at the gates of the plant for 20 minutes, with 30 to 40 policemen opposing
several hundred enraged strikers. The strikers pelted the officers with iron nuts, bolts and milk
bottles and spurted thick streams of water on them from fire hoses. The police retaliated with tear
gas and riot guns.”
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Moreover, these striker-trespassers and their progressive Democratic allies may have
intimidated the Supreme Court into expanding its interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s
Commerce Clause to permit what would otherwise have been unconstitutional—the Wagner Act
and broader New Deal.281 Ahmed White argues that the Flint sit-down strike “played the key role
in influencing the Supreme Court to follow through in upholding the constitutionality of Wagner
Act (and thus the entire New Deal) later that spring, in the landmark Jones & Laughlin Steel
decision.”282
[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in the Jones & Laughlin case cannot be understood
apart from the Justices’ apprehensions about where this remarkable upsurge of
labor militancy might lead if the Wagner Act were not upheld, which looms as
important in this regard as the President’s court-packing scheme and the magnitude
of his and other New Deal candidates’ landslide victories in the 1936 election.283
By the time the Supreme Court held the NLRA constitutional in 1937, “a strong drive to organize
the mass-production industries was under way.”284 Helped “by the missionary enthusiasm of the
many new unionists, but also by favorable court decisions and a friendly national administration,
union membership grew apace.”285 “One by one the large corporations in the great massproduction industries of steel, automobiles, rubber, and meat packing recognized unions
representing a majority of their employees and concluded their first labor-management
agreements. Almost equally great gains were made in many smaller establishments. Unions won
contracts literally by the thousands.”286

Twice the attacking police were repulsed. The winds had shifted and sent the tear gas back on the
officers, who were then pelted with metal hinges thrown by the strikers. A crowd of sympathizers
protected the strikers and the police retreated.
“The battle ended with the strikers in complete control of the gates,”
...
[D]espite his mobilizing 4,000 National Guardsmen, [Gov.] Murphy refused to use them against the
workers. The besieged sit-downers held. They continued to warm themselves with barrels of burning
coke. Wives and others sympathizers brought food and news to the windows.
Id.
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As Melvyn Dubofsky writes, 1937 was “exceptional” because the labor “strikes were
massive and nationwide as well as innovative in their tactics (this was the year par excellence for
the sit-down strike).”287 Second, Dubofsky stresses that the 1937 “strike results produced a major
transformation in the dominant pattern of labor-capital relations in [manufacturing, as] trade
unionism had come to stay in that sector of the economy and capital began to bargain with labor’s
representatives.288 Ahmed White agrees that 1937 “is probably the single most critical year in
American labor history,” with “4740 strikes involving over seven percent of the working
population.”289
The late 1930s saw “a dramatic rise in the number of unionized employees, and thus of
collective bargaining agreements.”290 This continued during World War II,291 and greatly increased
the number of collective bargaining agreements and thus of employers no longer free to fire and
re-assign workers at will, but instead constrained by CBAs and arbitrators’ interpretations of those
CBAs.292 In R.W. Fleming’s words, the timing of
[t]he tremendous growth of grievance arbitration . . . is not surprising. Grievance
arbitration presupposes the existence of collective bargaining agreements.
Collective bargaining agreements, in turn, presuppose union organization. The
great growth in the labor movement, especially in the mass production industries,
occurred in the years following passage of the Wagner Act in 1935.293
As Edwin Witte wrote in 1953, “It is only in the last fifteen years,” (or since 1938) that the number
of labor arbitrations “has run into the thousands annually.”294 The most important reasons for this
growth of labor arbitration, Witte wrote, “are the increase in the number of collective-bargaining
agreements and the inclusion in the great majority of these contracts of provisions for arbitration
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as the last step in the settlement of grievances involving the interpretation and application of the
contract.”295 Nolan and Abrams agree that “American labor arbitration had come of age by
1941.”296
During the Second World War, the basic trade of CBAs—labor’s no-strike promise in
exchange for arbitration of grievances—was informally brokered by the War Labor Board.297
“Besides exercising functions during the War akin to, although not technically arbitration, the
National War Labor Board did a great deal to foster voluntary arbitration.”298 And to this day the
federal government supports labor arbitration, with the Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service
maintaining a roster of arbitrators for labor disputes,299 while no analogous federal agency provides
a similar service for other arbitration.
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Many grievance processes resemble each other and use a stepped procedure progressively elevating
a grievance to higher levels of decision makers. For instance, the first step of the process may be
that the employee informally brings the grievance to the attention of a supervisor. If the supervisor
is unable to remedy the grievance, then the second step may require that the union shop steward file
a written grievance with a manager, and that the steward and manager meet within a set short time
to discuss the grievance and their interpretations of the CBA. If the manager is unable to remedy the
grievance, then the third step may require that the union president and company president or director
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IV.

CONCLUSION

“The history of labor arbitration is inextricably entwined with that of collective bargaining
and the broader history of labor.”300 This Article has shown that while a significant amount of
commercial arbitration occurred at each stage of U.S. history, labor arbitration was extremely rare
until the 20th century, and remained uncommon until the New Deal of the 1930s. In the late 19th
and early 20th centuries—amidst vast inequalities of wealth and violent labor disputes—employers
generally succeeded in maintaining at-will employment by refusing to recognize labor unions, let
alone agree to unions’ demands to replace at-will employment with arbitration of employee
grievances. Pre-1930s employer successes in defeating unions were aided by a range of legal
doctrines from the law of master-servant and tort, to the Sherman Antitrust Act and enforcement
of workers’ promises not to join unions, to Lochner era constitutional law. And all these doctrines
were undergirded by a classical liberal emphasis on freedom of contract with respect to the sale of
labor.
By contrast, the Great Depression combined with the early 20th century ideological shift
from classical liberalism to progressivism to produce massive legal changes in the 1930s. The key
legal change was legally-encouraged labor cartelization, the economic policy of the landmark
Wagner Act of 1935, now known as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA’s
legally-encouraged labor cartelization produced labor grievance arbitration by empowering unions
to extract from employers the promises—like firing workers only “for cause”—that create the
claims (grievances) in labor arbitration, as well as employers’ promises to resolve those claims in
arbitration rather than litigation. And labor grievance arbitration’s roots in legally-encouraged
labor cartelization largely explain many of labor arbitration’s important differences from other
arbitration, as discussed in Labor Grievance Arbitration’s Differences.301

Voluntary arbitration and fact-finding are widely used in labor-management relations. The FMCS
Office of Arbitration provides valuable services for parties seeking arbitration through its roster of
approximately 1,000 arbitrators. It also oversees the roster to assure compliance with FMCS policies
and procedures and with the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of LaborManagement Disputes.
Upon request, FMCS provides panels of arbitrators experienced in labor relations issues, from which
the parties can select as provided in their collective bargaining agreement or other mutual agreement.
Requests can be tailored to accommodate a variety of requirements, including for expertise, fees,
and geography, provided both parties agree. Other kinds of customization are available.
Id.
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While private-sector unions, and thus labor arbitration, declined in the late 20th century,
progressive energy has now returned to labor matters, including their antitrust aspects.302 This then,
is a good time to absorb lessons from the first big eras of labor and antitrust activism, and hopefully
this Article has contributed to that end.
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